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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Kyle Wesley Smith 
 
Master of Arts 
 
Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies Program 
 
June 2020 
 
Title: The Networked Public Sphere in Moscow: How Young Adults Navigate Social 
Media and the Online Space 
 
In this thesis I examine how social media and the internet function as an 
alternative to Habermas’ public sphere and their potential to facilitate public discourse in 
the Russian Federation. Using in-depth interviews conducted in Moscow in 2019, I 
attempt to show how recent political and social circumstances influence such uses by 
young adults. To understand actually existing uses of these technologies, I contextualize 
these interviews within facets of post-Soviet life such as media bias, lack of trust in 
journalistic institutions and politicians, and political apathy. In this sense, this project has 
the potential to show how agentive uses of social media and the online space function as 
an alternative to Habermas’ public sphere within the context of my interlocutors’ 
lifeworlds.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
My primary interest as a researcher is understanding how citizens of the Russian 
Federation are impacted by the rising use of social media technologies. More specifically, 
I am looking at the role that social media and other media sources play in Russian life 
and how they influence the way Russian citizens interact with news and other political 
information. As noted by some scholars, the decentralized nature of technologies may 
have the potential to act as an alternative to Habermas’ public sphere, thus revitalizing 
the potential for open public discourse and mitigating the influence of state or private 
interest groups. In this networked public sphere, “digital technologies reduce the 
individual cost of participating in civic life … [and] some may be motivated by 
independent online media reports or emboldened by encountering like-minded 
individuals online to take action” (Alexanyan, et. al. 2012, 5). They have the potential to 
foster dialogues and understanding between people who may be vulnerable to 
misinformation from centers of power.  
However, it is important to maintain a sober view of these potentials, as those 
opposing this cyber-utopianist perspective point out. Social media to date has not been 
the massive democratizing force that many hoped it would be, but instead it remains a 
contested domain with many actors and interests. In these ways, use of these technologies 
has led to a new information environment in Russia that contrasts sharply with the top-
down model in the Soviet period, while at the same time creating a new information 
environment that is not yet fully understood. 
This study is based upon in-depth interviews with twelve young adults living in 
Moscow during 2019. I explore crucial aspects of the networked public sphere and then 
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contextualize how this sphere is experienced in Russia based on prior ethnographic 
accounts of the region and my in-depth interviews. I also draw from my personal 
experiences living in Moscow from 2016 until 2018, as this is when many of the ideas for 
this project originated. I add to the existing scholarship on the networked public sphere 
by interpreting the lived experience of internet users in Moscow. I then contextualize 
their use of the networked public sphere by linking it to recent political circumstances 
that influence their adoption of social media as an alternative public sphere. This 
approach acknowledges the agency of my interlocutors as they selectively adopt 
technologies into their everyday lives. Analyzing facets of post-Soviet life such as media 
bias, lack of trust in journalistic institutions and politicians, and political apathy is equally 
important to understanding the uses of these technologies. In this sense, this project has 
the potential to show the how social media and the online space function as an alternative 
to Habermas’ public sphere in the context of my interlocutors lives. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Public Sphere 
The concept of the public sphere was first introduced by Jurgen Habermas to 
denote the “realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can 
be formed” (1974, 49). According to his original conception of the public sphere, citizens 
are able to formulate public opinion through public debate and then exert influence on the 
state via periodic democratic elections, or via other such institutions which allow citizens 
to influence state policy. Thus, it is the public sphere “which mediates between society 
and state” (50). For such a public sphere to exist necessarily demands certain guarantees 
such as of freedom of assembly, association, and freedom to express and publish their 
opinions “about general matters of interest” (49). Before the emergence of the internet, 
the closest thing to such a sphere was the mass media in the form of radio, television, and 
newspapers. However, Habermas rightfully points out that although the mass media at the 
time was the closest approximation of a public sphere, it has historically been rife with 
structural constraints and interest groups which exclude a vast array of voices. The 
centralized nature of the mass media was a key factor that excluded certain groups from 
such a public sphere.1 With the onset of our current digitally networked society, made 
possible by the advent of the internet and social media, citizens are no longer completely 
reliant on the mass media to access or share opinions. This ‘networked’ public sphere 
                                                        
1 The idea of a public sphere has been critiqued and expanded upon since Habermas’ original conception of 
the term in 1962. Nancy Fraser, for her part, rejected the idea that “interlocutors in a public sphere can… 
[overcome] asymmetries of power and deliberate ‘as if’ they were peers, when in fact they are not”. She 
distinguishes between two types of publics - “weak publics”, which generate public opinion and “strong 
publics”, whose deliberations issue sovereign decisions (1990, 75). Additional critiques posit that 
Habermas’ theory fell short of acknowledging the exclusionary nature of the bourgeois public sphere as it 
overlooks women’s, worker’s, and ethnic minorities’ counterpublics (Eley, 1992; Ryan, 1990) 
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may act as an alternative space for the formulation of public opinion through debate and 
consensus. However, as we will see, this digital variant is complex and comes with its 
own array of issues.  
 
The Networked Public Sphere 
Yochai Benkler defines the networked public sphere as “a way of thinking about 
the cluster of technologies and practices we use to talk to each other about what matters 
most, to decide what counts as true, or untrue, and what counts as relevant to … or not 
relevant to political debate” (2016). The cluster of technologies to which Benkler is 
referring primarily centers around social media technologies, which enable computer-
mediated communication that “expand(s) the capabilities of face-to-face interaction to 
provide new opportunities for finding, observing, and interacting efficiently with others 
across time and space” (Bayer, et. al. 2020, 75).  
As noted by Kruse, Norris, and Flinchum, the structure of social media makes it a 
plausible candidate for an alternative to Habermas’ idealized public sphere in that it may 
go farther in providing access to information, equal participation, and the absence of 
institutional influence (2018, 63). This accessibility could allow people “to challenge 
discourses, share alternative perspectives, and publish their own opinions” (Loader and 
Mercea 2011, 760). Additionally, its decentralized structure may eschew traditional 
media narratives and power structures by allowing for increased access, participation, 
reciprocity, and peer-to-peer rather than one-to-many communication (Jenkins 2006, 6).  
Scholars point to these affordances as giving rise to independent contributors who 
offer “competing expertise” that challenges traditional media influence. In these ways, 
 
 5 
the networked public sphere is often discussed as a promising alternative to ‘traditional’ 
mass media (such as television and radio) which often persists in “controlling public 
discourse, restricting the spread of culture, placing profits before people, and colluding 
with the state” (Goldberg 2011, 742). 
However, much of the initial promise of social media as a viable alternative 
public sphere has faded in recent years. As the reach of these technologies has grown, 
their second-order effects have started to make themselves known. Seemingly utopian 
ideas such as decentralization of agenda setting and the potential to overturn traditional 
power structures are now understood in a different light. Benkler provides the rise of 
Breitbart news during the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election as an example. This rise was 
caused in part by the decentralized nature of social media, which led to an upending of 
traditional media power structures, but the outcome in this instance, and increasingly 
many others like it, has been less than favorable (2016). Both scholars and individual 
users are finding that unfiltered news feeds can be inundated with information from many 
actors ranging from targeted advertising, to corporate espionage, to state actors posing as 
grass roots activists (Zittrain 2016).  
Additionally, scholars note that the for-profit nature of social media is a limiting 
factor in its ability to function as an alternative public sphere. This corporate interest 
often contradicts many of the potentially positive aspects of social media as a public 
sphere. It manifests in a number of ways including surveillance, targeted advertising, and 
predictive algorithms. Surveillance, performed at many levels by the state, corporations, 
and even interpersonally by friends, family, and employers, threatens to constrain 
information and participation (Kruse, et. al. 2016, 66), leading some scholars to liken its 
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effect to Foucault’s panopticon (Bossewitch and Sinnreich 2013, 224-225). Predictive 
algorithms can serve to reify users’ worldview by showing them content that they already 
agree with and thus constrain potential dialogic mechanisms. These are just a few of the 
key political-economic issues related to the networked public sphere and, as Goldberg 
notes, “on the internet there is no ‘debating and deliberating’ that is not also ‘buying and 
selling’; participation is a commercial act” (2011, 747). 
 
The Networked Public Sphere in the Russian Context 
Literature on the networked public sphere in the Russian Federation has 
highlighted some of the potential benefits and drawbacks of these technologies for 
deliberative democracy in a constricted or “neo-Soviet” media environment. Because of 
the constrained environment in which traditional Russian media outlets were forced to 
operate, scholars in the late 2000s and 2010s were initially optimistic about the potential 
of democratization propelled by the internet (Oats 2013, 13). The largely unrestricted 
internet stood in contrast to traditional media outlets. While some sectors of the media, 
such as print, do contain a diversity of opinions and are less controlled, key broadcast 
outlets generally adhere to Kremlin-backed narratives (Becker 2004, 145; De Smaele 
2007, 1310; Konzhukov 2014, 247). As such, contemporary Russian media has never 
developed into a democratic model, but instead contains norms and structures that are 
reminiscent of Soviet times. In this way, the role of the media “as objective or balanced 
has never been widely adopted” (Oats 2007, 1296). 
To understand this emerging information space, scholars have focused on either 
media structures or how comparatively elite and politically active members of Russian 
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society are using the internet. One of the earliest attempts to understand the impact of the 
internet on democracy in Russia was a 2008 study carried out by Fossato, et. al. Their 
work was able to show the early emergence of a vibrant community of bloggers who 
enjoyed an immense degree of freedom of expression. However, it was unable to 
demonstrate that this community was driving political agendas, or reaching a broad user-
base. Instead the internet at that time was serving to spread information largely among 
“closed clusters of like-minded users who are seldom able or willing to cooperate” 
(Fossato, et. al. 2008, 51). Additionally, the study focused on groups who were already 
politically active online, and excluded those who were not both politically engaged and 
active online. 
In another attempt to outline the networked public sphere in Russia, The Berkman 
Center traced the spread of “contagious phenomena” by tracking political hashtags on 
Twitter (Kelly, et. al. 2012, 3). By tracking known opposition and pro-government 
hashtags, they determined that, in general, pro-Kremlin hashtags sparked high levels of 
subsequent uses over a short period of time, while opposition hashtags exhibited “greater 
staying power,” albeit with lower levels of subsequent uses (15). This study, while useful 
from a macro-level in determining the attention that certain political topics received and 
mapping their salience and staying power on Twitter, is limited in the same ways as the 
Fossato (2008) study. In addition, it looks only at how certain hashtags have been used 
over time and ignores the reasons behind their use.  
In a later study, the Berkman Center analyzed how the Russian “blogosphere” 
was being used to broaden media narratives on salient political topics (Etling, Roberts, 
and Faris 2014, 3).  Findings revealed some evidence that blogs were acting as a limited 
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alternative public sphere. These blogs often contained media narratives that differed from 
the largely Kremlin-controlled broadcast and print media such as Rossiskaya Gazeta, RIA 
Novosti, Pervyi Kanal and Rossiia 24 (45). Citizens were able not only to share evidence 
of election fraud during the 2010 parliamentary elections, but to share their thoughts on 
the matter online. This in turn created increased solidarity of opposition groups and may 
have led to greater support during the “White Revolution” (45). In this way, there was 
increased potential for some grass roots agenda setting and government accountability 
through online peer-to-peer sharing of information. However, they note that relatively 
few internet users in Russia actually used blogs as a source of information at the time, 
and that the top 25 most visited online news outlets contained agendas similar to 
Kremlin-backed narratives (46). Additionally, they found evidence of pro-Kremlin 
bloggers attempting to pull conversations back to government-driven narratives, 
suggesting early attempts by the state to influence the online space (45).  
Despite examples of political discourse online which eschew Kremlin-backed 
narratives, not all scholars agree with the assessment that social media should be seen a 
potential force for democratization. Evgeny Morozov notes that the internet space is a 
domain that is equally, if not more constricted by power structures as traditional forms of 
media (2012, 16). He critiques the “cyber-utopianism” of the 2000s and early 2010s as a 
“belated cold-war triumphalism” which incorrectly assumes that the West will be able to 
export democracy and upend authoritarianism by simply relying on the internet as a 
“Radio Free Europe on steroids” (13). He criticizes this view as one that ignores the 
systemic issues which led to the fall of the Soviet Union and gives too much credit to the 
“genius of Ronald Reagan” (13).  
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Kristen Meredith applies the “cyber realism” of Morozov to analyze the “White 
Revolution” and the interplay between oppositionists and the Russian state. She argues 
that while social media may have acted as a limited alternative public sphere, the Russian 
state was able to use new methods for restricting and influencing civic discourse online 
(2013, 90). Just as social media enabled opposition members to organize, it enabled the 
state to surveil and police the public. The state used a number of tactics to obscure the 
information environment such as paid bloggers, fake social media accounts, and 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on opposition sites (92). Thus, just as social 
media offers new affordances for bottom-up agenda setting, it offers new opportunities 
for top-down responses to this agenda setting.  
Seva Gunistky expands upon this by pointing out that autocratic regimes have 
been able to use the internet for counter-mobilization efforts and discourse framing, 
among other things (2015, 42). He argues that such regimes are becoming more 
sophisticated in the way they use online space both to mobilize already existing bases of 
support and as a barometer of public opinions which exist around salient political issues. 
In this way, the online space actually represents an opportunity to counter opposition 
movements by understanding exactly which issues are being discussed. Thus, he argues, 
having some degree of dissident activity online is tolerated only because it allows state 
actors to identify relevant issues which could fester into protest movements or, more 
drastically, regime change. Once key issues are identified, media narratives can be 
controlled by introducing spurious counter-narratives designed to discredit dissidents and 
overwhelm the information space (45). As an example, he points to the Kremlin’s use of 
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“web brigades” of thousands of commenters who are paid to comment on pro-democracy 
forums in an effort to control the conversation and detract from core issues (46). 
In Revolution Stalled, a thorough account of the networked public sphere in 
Russia, Sarah Oats attempts to understand the impact and uses of the internet in the 
sphere of political communication. She eschews the binary between cyber-optimism and 
cyber-pessimism to understand why revolution, or at least increased democratization, has 
not yet occurred in response to the relative openness of the Russian internet (Oates 2013, 
196). Although her work does provide an exhaustive account of the online space and its 
potential to impact political communication and deliberative democracy, her focus is 
primarily on the “Fourth Estate” (media institutions), government controls, and online 
content rather than the everyday uses of the internet. 
As I have noted, the aforementioned studies have been useful in showing the 
relative openness of the Russian internet, especially in contrast with the Soviet-like 
traditional media sources. However, so far none of these sources have put the user, or 
everyday use of the internet at the center of analysis. There are studies which look at 
internet users in Russia, but these are limited to comparatively elite members of Russian 
society.  
In her 2012 book, No Illusions, the Voices of Russia’s Future Leaders, Ellen 
Mickiewicz used focus groups with students at three elite Russian universities to 
understand the “way that Russia’s future leaders view their own leaders, democracy, the 
larger world, and the most intense focus of their international outlook: the United States” 
(8). A large part of these focus groups centered on use of the internet and alternative 
sources of media, which, Mickiewicz argues, has led to an intense change in the types 
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and sources of information these Russians trust. Her findings indicate that the “status” of 
news outlets have little importance in determining trust and that content on the internet is 
key. These findings are partially supported by Joanna Szostek who, through in-depth 
interviews with 20 students at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics (one of the 
country’s top universities), determined that while her interlocutors reported using a 
diverse collection of online sources to try and arrive at an objective view of events, they 
were still influenced by narratives reported on Kremlin-aligned media (2018, 82). 
While a handful of ethnographic accounts of the internet space in Russia and the 
former Soviet Union do exist, they are already largely outdated (due to the rapid advance 
of technology in this space) and they do not put the networked public sphere at the center 
of analysis. In his 2012 article (based on fieldwork done 2009-2010) on the significance 
of the internet in everyday life in Russia, Jeremy Morris makes a crucial connection 
between the ‘virtual’ world of the internet and its embeddedness in already existing social 
and cultural structures (1558). He focuses on actually existing use of the internet in a 
provincial “European” Russian town and finds that its use is largely limited to enhancing 
already existing social connections (1550). Jeremy Morris’ account eschews such media-
centrism. I follow him in taking the everyday lived reality as the starting point of 
analysis. Interestingly, he is able to connect central elements of contemporary Russian 
culture such as Ledenova’s blat with use of social media. He points out that his 
collaborators’ social media accounts consisted mainly of “other-regarding” posts to and 
from friends designed to maintain already existing social connections. Use of comment 
sections was rare in comparison to anglophone countries, thus he doubts any major 
possibility for substantial communicative discourse (1559). He also comments on his 
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collaborators’ lack of reliance on internet news, concluding, “Russians get their news on 
television” (a statement that I will argue is no longer true) (1551). This study, while 
situating online practices within everyday life, is already nearly ten years old and, 
according to my experience, no longer reflects the actually existing use of the internet. 
 
Conceptualizing a Russian Public Sphere 
While the above studies have contributed meaningful media-centric or systemic 
views of the networked public sphere in Russia, they are largely ahistorical and omit key 
themes in late and post-soviet Russian culture which may impact actual use of the 
internet as an alternative public sphere. It is necessary to acknowledge such use as an 
agentive process governed by thinking individuals who have come of age amid a 
confluence of societal changes. As put by Stephen Woolgar when talking about the study 
of the internet and society, “we need to disaggregate the phenomenon, to focus much 
more on bottom-up experiences, on the nitty-gritty of actually making the damn modem 
work” (2009, 6).  
Such a user-centric approach to the networked public sphere requires attention not 
only to the affordances of social media and the internet, but to uses of such an alternative 
public sphere itself in the Russian context. In Habermas’ own conception of this user-
centric approach, I am looking at the lifeworlds of my interlocutors. For Habermas, the 
lifeworld is distinct from the system (economic and administrative power) and serves as 
the “horizon within which communicative actions are ‘always, already’ moving” (1984, 
119). Such communicative actions serve to reproduce cultural knowledge and promote 
social integration, solidarity, and the formation of personal identities through 
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socialization (137). Uses of the networked public sphere must be interpreted within such 
communicative action and the lived experiences or lifeworlds of Russian citizens. To 
locate some context within these lifeworlds it is important to acknowledge certain aspects 
of Russian culture and society which may frame their interaction with the networked 
public sphere. 
The first of these issues is the absence of free and open public discourse during 
the Soviet period. Rather than being based upon open deliberation, public discourse in the 
Soviet Union took place within the confines of the Communist Party’s interpretation of 
Marxism-Leninism. In this way, ideology was not “up for debate” in the same way as it is 
in Habermasian notions of the public sphere. I refer here to Yurchak’s observations of the 
nonexistence of metadiscourse concerning party ideology during the late Soviet period. 
He contends that Soviet citizens had largely stopped internalizing speeches from party 
members, party slogans, and propaganda as accurate descriptors of reality. 2 Rather, such 
speech and its reproduction by Soviet citizens increasingly became simply a necessity to 
live within the system, and decreasingly associated with its literal meaning. While 
agentive reinterpretations of the Soviet system allowed soviet citizens to live “normal” 
lives, the public sphere was essentially constrained by the inability to communicate such 
interpretations via any type of public forum (Yurchak 2005). The mediation between 
lifeworlds and the system via a public sphere was virtually non-existent. 
With the fall of the Soviet Union after perestroika, public discourse emerged 
quickly. Critiques of the Soviet and system dominated both the mass media as well as the 
                                                        
2 I focus here on speech, but it is important to point out that Yurchak’s view is that this took place at all 
levels of Soviet society – including elections, parades, examinations, meetings, etc.  
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lifeworlds of Russian citizens (Ries 1996, 166). The entire country was subject to a 
period of economic chaos and political upheaval from which post-Soviet media 
companies where not exempt. Though the mass media was now free to contribute to 
meta-discourses about ideology, it was constrained by market as well as state factors that 
severely limited its ability to function as an effective public sphere. Managers and 
journalistic staffs had to deal with the numerous problems inherent to changing the entire 
economic system such as the withdrawal of financial support from the government and a 
lack of advertising revenue from newly emerging private companies (Konzhukov 2016, 
242).  
This climate of privatization was competitive for media organizations that were 
sometimes forced to make deals with the Yeltsin administration for survival, in exchange 
for altering their content to fit the narrative prescribed by the Kremlin. The Russian state 
was able to control media messaging via economic means. It was able to “subsidize the 
‘loyal’ publications and (give) them tax breaks as well as special deals on newsprint, ink, 
and publishing expenses” (Konzhukov 2016, 246). 
Despite these structural constraints during the Yeltsin regime, there were a 
number of private oppositionist media outlets that, for a time, started to grow in size and 
audience. However they were eventually shut down or significantly hindered in their 
ability to publish and/or broadcast in the early 2000s during the start of Putin’s time in 
office. For example, the editorial managers of Lenta.ru “were replaced by the 
publication’s owner when the news website was seen as taking its Kremlin criticism too 
far; the independent television station TV Rain was forced to broadcast from an 
apartment after being kicked out of its studios; and most recently, there was a purge of 
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the newspaper RBC after a string of reports on the wealth of Vladimir Putin’s inner circle 
and an investigation into one of the president’s daughters” (Kovalov 2017). Upon 
meeting their newly appointed editors, RBC journalists subsequently taped their 
conversations. In one conversation about the need for self-censorship, the newly 
appointed editors compared the work of the paper to traffic laws saying, “If you drive 
over the solid double line, they take away your license... Unfortunately, nobody knows 
where the solid double line is” and, “Our job is to show our professionalism in such a 
way that the traffic is safe for the people inside and for the pedestrians” (Hansen 2017, 
20).  
It is also important to point out that the lived experiences or lifeworlds of Russian 
citizens may make them less inclined to and, from a practical point of view, less able to 
influence governing institutions and the system in general via the public sphere. As this 
applies to the focal point of my research, the networked public sphere, users may be less 
likely to employ it for political discourse, instead focusing on utilitarian and apolitical 
uses. In her analysis of informal practices and the rule of law, Ledeneva draws on 
Bourdieu to distinguish the activities of institutions, which can be thought of as 
controlling the rules of the game, from the actual practices of those “playing” the game 
(22, 2006). By doing this she challenges traditional notions of focusing simply on the 
activities and laws employed by institutions in favor of practices, which show the 
relationship between cultural norms and rules. She argues that Russians are used to 
operating in the grey areas of the law, and are not inclined to try to change them. In the 
Russian context, laws have traditionally been seen as opposed to morals. Iakovlev points 
out “that conscience and ethics are supposed to be the basic part of law-consciousness 
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and that public morals are supposed to be the foundations of law are taken for granted in 
Western legal culture” (1995, 12). 
For these reasons, one can argue that the conception of the networked public 
sphere leading to democratization is too narrowly constrained by western conceptions of 
deliberative democracy. It must be asked, are Russians likely to use the online space for 
deliberative democracy when “the incoherence of formal rules compels almost all 
Russians, willingly or unwillingly, to violate them and to play by rules introduced and 
negotiated outside formal institutions” (Ledenova 2006, 13)? It seems more likely, given 
this historical context, that most Russians would not use the networked public sphere to 
mediate between their lifeworld and the system.  
I attempt to show that use among ordinary citizens is often apolitical and 
utilitarian in nature. Even Russians who use the internet actively and use a diverse array 
of media resources are not inclined to actively contribute to political discussions online. 
While the internet should be considered a counter to the hegemony of state-aligned 
media, it should not be conflated with a source for deep political change. In an attempt to 
provide a non-media-centric perspective of uses of the networked public sphere, I provide 
an account of my own experiences living in Moscow and conducting in-depth interviews 
with twelve “ordinary” young adults.3 In these ways, this paper, while keeping an eye on 
the networked public sphere, seeks to explore use of the internet in social and cultural 
contexts that I have witnessed, while connecting such use to key themes in Russian 
culture and history. 
                                                        
3 Who exactly these “ordinary” Russians are will be discussed in depth in the methodology 
section.  
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III. ETHNOGRAPHIC SCOPE AND METHODS 
I conducted in-depth interviews with twelve Russian young adults between the 
ages of 23 to 30 in Moscow, Russia from August-September 2019. Subjects were 
recruited offline via contacts established during my time living in Moscow prior to the 
research period and via snowball sampling. I recorded all interviews on my personal 
mobile phone. I was initially weary of using my phone, but it proved to be an effective 
means of documenting our conversations. Because the presence of phones is so 
normalized in the current social environment, my phone went essentially unnoticed. 
Questions were based on five main research interests and designed to allow room 
for conversation about agentive uses of social media as well as how social media is used 
as a networked public sphere. Throughout my interviews I sought to determine my 
collaborators’ preferred social media sites and applications; their “everyday” uses of 
social media; uses of social media for dialogic exchange; media bias and views of 
journalism; and elements of trust and political change. I included the last topic in order to 
ensure that at least part of our conversations were based on politics. Additionally, protests 
in the summer of 2019, which took place just before my interviews, provided a useful 
framework through which I could understand how my collaborators where using social 
media to understand what exactly was going on at these protests.  
Originally, I planned to recruit all of my collaborators via snowball sampling, but 
that quickly proved difficult and unreliable. Instead I relied largely on my friends and 
acquaintances from my time living in the city 2016-2018. Eight of my twelve participants 
were friends whom I had known previously, while the remaining four were recommended 
to me by these friends. Thus, my initial rapport-building with the majority of my 
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collaborators was built upon earlier friendships and acquaintances. Though this 
recruitment method came at the cost of a random sample population, my existing bonds 
with my collaborators allowed for more openness and greater depth of information. Prior 
to conducting this research I received approval from the University of Oregon Research 
Compliance Office. 
Seven of the twelve interviews were conducted in Russian, which is not my native 
language. However, I do possess a reasonable level of proficiency and had prepared 
specific research questions which I cross-checked with a native speaker. Interviews 
conducted in English were done so upon the request of the interviewees, who were often 
eager to practice their English. We agreed to switch to Russian whenever they felt it was 
difficult to express an idea in English, and on many occasions they did. In hindsight, I do 
wish that I had conducted all the interviews in Russian. I believe that my collaborators’ 
word choice and characterizations of the media and political happenings may have been 
richer in Russian. Additionally, when speaking in a foreign language, there is a shift in 
“power” dynamic. It would have been more beneficial for my interviewees to be in the 
position of the “knower” of the language. 
 
Demographic Information 
One of my main criticisms of previous studies of the networked public sphere in 
Russia is the focus on comparatively elite or privileged members of Russian society 
(Mickiewicz, 2012; Szostek, 2018). This study is focused on young adults who, while 
now working professionals in Moscow, came from relatively humble backgrounds. Many 
achieved early success in their careers and can be considered either approaching or in the 
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“middle class” of Moscow society. They do not, however, represent a cross section of 
society that could be considered manual laborers or rural citizens. The demographic 
information below provides an overview of the young adults who partook in the study.  
Findings from the demographics section show that the average age of the twelve 
interviewees was 26.17, with five identifying as male and seven identifying as female. 
Interestingly, only three had lived in Moscow their entire lives, with the other nine having 
moved there almost immediately after finishing their university degrees, or moving there 
to complete their degrees. The average time spent living in Moscow for those not born in 
the city was 3.9 years. The sample consisted largely of young professionals working in 
various spheres: three in business-related occupations (marketing, demand planning, and 
sales), two designers (graphic and clothing), two in entertainment (entry-level 
screenwriting and video editing), one computer programmer, two university students, one 
Russian language teacher, and one athlete (supported by federal funding for Russian 
Olympic athletes). Seven interviewees had bachelor’s degrees, two had master’s, and two 
had high school diplomas (but were working toward their university degrees).  
 
Personal Background to the Study 
It is necessary to discuss my time living in Russia from 2016 to 2018, as this is when 
many anecdotal accounts regarding use of social media in Moscow first made their 
impressions on me. Indeed, my previous experiences living in Moscow led to the 
gestation of this research project. During this period, I worked as a business and freelance 
English language teacher, with a few additional jobs as an editor for a tech company and 
content creator for a small startup. This was my first-hand foray into the lives of  
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Table 1. Demographic details of all interviewees with pseudonyms to ensure anonymity. 
 
Russians. I was forced to live with some approximation of the economic realities of 
Moscow and to shed my naiveties about what life there was actually like. Of course, my 
living there was by choice and my salary, although meager by American standards, was 
Name Age Gender 
Length of 
Residence 
in 
Moscow 
Hometown Occupation Education 
Alexei 24 Male 2 Years Tver, Russia 
Freelancer/ 
digital 
marketer 
Bachelor's  
Sofia  23 Female 2 Years Tver, Russia 
Business 
analyst/ 
programmer 
Bachelor's 
Ksenia 24 Female  2.5 Years Saratov, Russia 
English 
Teacher 
High 
School 
Ivan 24 Male 5 years Tver, Russia Student High School 
Maksim 30 Male 30 Years Moscow, Russia 
Screenwriter 
& director Bachelor's 
Aidar 30 Male 7 Years Neftekamsk, Russia 
Demand 
Planner Master's 
Svetlana 27 Female 9 Years Omsk, Russia Russian Teacher Specialist 
Nikolai 30 Male 5 Years Ashkabad, Turkmenistan 
Account 
Manager/ 
Sales 
Bachelor's 
Vera 23 Female 1 Year Orenburg, Russia  
Cothing 
Designer Bachelor's 
Marina 23 Female 2 Years Orenburg, Russia  
Graphic 
Designer Master's  
Tatiana 30 Female 30 Years  Moscow, Russia Video Editor Bachelor's 
Natalia 26 Female 26 Years Moscow, Russia Athlete Bachelor's 
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roughly equivalent to the household average for Muscovites. Nonetheless, my naive 
notions of formal laws and practices which reflect those laws and my conceptions of a 
democratizing Russia striving toward a western model of governance (the list could go 
on) were all eventually pushed aside. These were replaced by getting paid late, under the 
table, or sometimes not at all, and witnessing how my Russian acquaintances navigated 
their everyday realities. I heard first-hand from my Russian colleagues, students, lovers, 
and friends, views of the crazy nineties (sumasshedshie devonostyе), the shortcomings of 
democratization, and the societal upheavals caused by privatization.4  
I vividly remember the interactions that lead me to start asking questions about 
the role of online space in Russian life. One such experience came when I was riding 
with a wealthy family’s driver. I used to tutor the family’s son once a week and made the 
roughly hour-long journey out to their gated community on the outskirts of the city. The 
driver and I were around the same age, had decent rapport, and often talked as we 
travelled along the Rublevo-Uspenskoye Shosse – the two-lane highway lined by massive 
green corrugated steel fences hiding the elites’ estates from public view. He mentioned 
once that he needed a new place to live with his soon-to-be wife. I recommended that he 
look at housing groups on Facebook, or on a Russian website called “Locals”. I had 
found roommates on Facebook, so I thought maybe he would have the same luck. 
However, to my surprise he scoffed at this suggestion saying, “Kyle you can’t trust 
people that you just find online. They will probably trick you and take your money or 
                                                        
4 I am unsure where exactly this term was first used: in the nineties the term democratization, 
demokratizatsiia, was often called dermokratizatsiia,  combining the Russian word demokratizatsiia  with 
the word for “shit” or dermo. This translates to “shitocracy,” illustrative of attitudes toward reforms during 
that era.  
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belongings.” I had similar interactions a few other times when discussing housing on 
social media sites. Even people who used social media for such things brought up 
cautionary tales of friends who paid their deposits and first month’s rent, moved all their 
belongings, only to come home and find everything moved into the hall and the locks on 
the door changed. I never heard about this happening first-hand, but many were 
convinced that this was a likely event.  
Despite these common trepidations, Russians do successfully use online sources 
for housing or any other wide variety of needs. I personally was able to find Russian 
roommates, a young couple who were 22 years old, to fill the empty room in my 
apartment via a Facebook group. However, when I showed them the apartment they were 
initially skeptical of me and thoroughly verified the details of the lease. To add another 
layer of complexity, our landlord at the time, a retired woman, relied on a real-estate 
agent to ensure some level of security in the lease. She forbade my use of social media 
for finding tenants; however, ironically, her real-estate agent used social media himself 
for this task. His official position as a real-estate agent gave her confidence, even though 
he did not do much besides shield her from the actual way in which he found new 
tenants. My landlord5 initially rejected the new roommates outright when she learned I 
had found them online, but warmed up to them when she found out that they were 
ethnically Russian (russkii, as opposed to rossiiskii)6 and had just moved from Tver, a 
                                                        
5 With time I came to understand that my landlord was quite a shrewd business woman, at least in terms of 
maximizing her rent prices. This behavior was completely understandable, as I suspect she relied on our 
rent for her living expenses.  
 
6 Russkii is used to describe an ethnic Russian, or someone living in Russia who is ethnically Slavic. This is 
opposed to rossiiskii, which denotes a person of Russian nationality, but who is not ethnically Slavic.  
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historic medium-sized city a few hours north-west of Moscow. This experience and many 
others like it led me to question levels of societal trust in Moscow and how, according to 
my perceptions, a comparative lack of trust influenced the online practices of Muscovites. 
I must also acknowledge other aspects of my positionality that may have impacted 
my interviews. First is my changing role from acquaintance and friend to researcher. The 
very act of me leaving Russia to pursue graduate study in the United States changed my 
identity in the eyes of my friends and acquaintances. I have come to understand that 
many with whom I became close saw me as someone who was drawn to Moscow by the 
opportunity of work, not necessarily by choice. Though I often tried to explain that I was 
there to experience Russia, to understand certain cross sections of Russian life, and 
improve my Russian language abilities, this is something I feel that I was never able to 
convey. Often, whether I wanted to be or not, I feel I was perceived as a fellow 
immigrant worker of sorts – brought to the economic center of the Russian world by its 
promise of a better life. Indeed, ten out of twelve of my collaborators moved to Moscow 
for work from smaller provincial cities, a common decision for young Russians in search 
of employment. In short, my arrival in Moscow for a few months to conduct research put 
my privilege on display in a more open way.7 I was no longer the fellow worker brought 
to Moscow for the chance of a better life, sharing an apartment with Russians, and calling 
Moscow “home”. Instead, I was a visitor who had ventured from my new home out into 
“the field” in order to collect data on their way of life. My relationships were not tainted 
                                                        
7 It is also worth noting the incredible difficulty for Russians to obtain travel visas to the United States. For 
young, especially female Russians, it is nearly impossible to receive a travel visa to the United States. I feel 
that this may have added to a sense of distance between some of my interlocutors and me, as they rightly 
sensed my privileged ability to cross national borders.  
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by this dynamic – far from it. However, it is worth noting this shift in my role as it relates 
to my friends turned interviewees.  
Additionally, my identity as an American may have had an impact on the data I 
gathered. Three of my twelve interviewees brought up that I was a spy, although they 
quickly assured me that they were just poking fun. As the questions turned away from 
general use of social media to more politically-charged topics, the atmosphere tended to 
grow less comfortable. Whether this was due to my identity as an American, or to a 
general sensitivity about discussing politics is not clear to me. I do not think my being an 
American influenced the course of the conversation in any notable way, but it is worth 
noting that some of my interviews were tinged with our nations’ tenuous relationship.  
 
Reciprocal Ethnography 
In an effort to create some degree of multivocality and avoid being the authorial 
voice on my interlocutors’ use of social media in Moscow, I undertook a reciprocal 
ethnographic approach. Reciprocal ethnography aims to create a “full hermeneutic circle” 
in which the interpretations of the ethnographer do not take precedence over their 
interlocutors’ interpretations (Lawless 1992, 311). This hermeneutic circle, ideally, is 
created through an iterative sharing of the ethnographic manuscript, producing a dialogue 
between ethnographer and collaborator. It is important to remember that “our 
interpretations are not necessarily the right or the insightful ones” (310).  
 After transcribing my interviews and doing an initial analysis by coding chunks 
of data and identifying patterns, I conducted a follow-up interview with Aleksei, one of 
my key collaborators from my summer 2019 fieldwork. This, however, should not be 
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considered a fully reciprocal ethnography in the sense that input from Aleksei was 
limited to one forty-five minute interview conducted via video chat. He was able to 
comment on my initial analysis, but it was very limited in comparison to other attempts at 
reciprocity (see Gay Y Blasco, 2017; Lawless, 1992). Input from Aleksei will be included 
in my analysis section. 
 
Methodological Limitations 
Though the combination of in-depth interviews and personal experiences has 
helped to illuminate how my interlocutors experience social media and the online space, 
these methodologies have limitations. This study lacks the traditional embeddedness of a 
full ethnography, in that I did not actively participate in the lives of my interlocutors for 
an extended period of time. Although I did live in Moscow before this study, I was not 
systematically recording my findings, nor did I have ethnographic training. I opted for in-
depth interviews due to limited time and funding for this project. 
Future studies would ideally use participant observation and virtual ethnography 
in combination with interviews; this would create a more holistic view of collaborators’ 
lived experience. A virtual ethnography in this case would be a passively observed 
analysis of social media profiles and other online spaces commonly used by my 
collaborators. Such an approach would rely less on the self-identified use of social media 
and the internet and would allow me to directly observe how this domain fits into my 
interlocutors’ lives. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
Access to Information and Social Media Preferences 
 As noted by many scholars of the networked public sphere in Russia, although the 
country lagged behind Europe and North America in terms of internet access in the early 
2000s, this situation has changed in recent years (Oates, 2013). There has been a rapid 
growth in internet availability, with 79.3 percent of the total population now active 
internet users. Of citizens between fifteen to twenty-four years of age (close to the 
demographic of this study), 96.7 percent now regularly use the internet. Additionally, 
within this demographic, 86.4 percent are active users of social media (Sabel’nikova, et. 
al.  2019, 8). 
This study confirms these trends and provides further evidence of the widespread 
access and use of social media and the internet. My collaborators indicated that the 
internet and social media in general occupy a large portion of their time relative to other 
activities. These young adults spent an average of 3.75 hours per day on some iteration of 
social media. I must note that these numbers include use of social media for work and 
personal purposes, thus average time of use per day may seem quite high. According to 
this study, the most commonly used social media sites on average were: YouTube 
(28.75% of total time on social media per day), Facebook (17.92%), Instagram (16.67%), 
Telegram (12.91%), and Vkontakte (10%).  
Because I focused on the networked public sphere as an alternative to traditional 
media, I collected data regarding where and how often my collaborators consume news. 
On average they spent 1.9 hours per day consuming news and overwhelmingly indicated 
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preference for online sources over traditional media.8 Of the total time spent consuming 
news or information about current events, 79.58 percent occurred on the internet, 15.3 
was received from friends, acquaintances, and relatives, 2.17% from newspapers, 1.75% 
from books, and only 0.42% from broadcast television. These metrics show that my 
collaborators spend a significant portion of their time on the internet. It is central to their 
gathering of news, garnering a notably higher percentage of their attention than other 
news sources. I must note, however, that the medium of communication does not 
necessarily determine the message. Just because the interviewees overwhelmingly 
indicated that they receive news from online sources does not on its own have significant 
implications for the networked public sphere. For example, many Kremlin-aligned news 
outlets are both online, in print, and on broadcast television. These distinctions will be 
discussed in later sections of the analysis. 
 
“Everyday” Uses of Social Media 
 In order to present an accurate ethnographic account it is necessary to focus not 
only on the political, but the “everyday” uses of social media. These are uses which my 
collaborators identified in their own terms when I prompted them with broad questions 
regarding their daily activity online. These uses are central to constructing a holistic view 
of the lived empirical reality of this cross section of Moscow society. For these people, 
social media, and the internet as a whole, function as a means for maintaining existing 
social contacts and for the fulfillment of everyday needs and interests. However, it also 
functions as a window into the potentialities of life, often outside of Russia. These 
                                                        
8 This data is supported by other qualitative studies (see Mickiewicz, 2012 and Szozek, 2018). 
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potentialities manifest in the form of career ambitions, wanderlust, or sustained contact 
with non-Russian friends who live abroad or friends who emigrated from Russia. 
Messaging applications such as Viber, WhatsApp, and Facebook Messenger, 
while not favored, are used primarily to keep in touch with older family members or 
international friends. Most collaborators prefer Telegram for keeping in contact with their 
Russian friends. They cite its overall ease of use and wide variety of “emojis” and 
“stickers” as their main reasons for preferring it over other messaging applications. 
Additionally, Telegram is used most often to create “chat groups” for work, again due to 
its convenience. Telegram’s other function, “secret chat”, was not identified as a reason 
for its use. The “secret chat” function allows users to communicate using end-to-end 
encryption, which is widely thought to render messages inaccessible to anyone other than 
the intended recipient. This function did come up during a few interviews, but 
collaborators did not cite it as the main reason that the messaging application was used. I 
sought clarification on this issue with Alexei (23, freelancer) (who was kind enough to 
comment on my initial analysis) and he confirmed that usually the decision to use 
Telegram is predicated upon its convenience (eto prosto udobno). On the contrary, 
Ksenia (English teacher, 24), the most politically outspoken of my collaborators, notes 
that WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger are insecure forms of communication and that 
the government could access messages sent on these platforms. Despite this, she still uses 
these applications, albeit sparingly. 
Of the “profile-based” social media applications such as Vkontakte, Facebook, 
and Instagram, the most commonly used is Instagram. Many enjoy that it is based around 
sharing and looking at photos and feel less inundated with outside content in comparison 
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to social media applications which use predictive algorithms to recommend content 
(Instagram does this to a lesser extent than other applications).  
Collaborators prefer Facebook to keep in contact with international friends, as 
well as for professional purposes (online marketing) and political content. Ksenia notes 
that she has a Swedish friend who “posts a lot of vegan, feminist, anarchist things” which 
are some of her main interests. For her, and a few other collaborators, it seems that 
Facebook functions as a way to keep up with various trends outside of Russia by looking 
at their international friends’ posts.  
It is worth noting that just over half (seven) of my collaborators regularly use 
social media as means of political information, while the remainder (five) did not 
mention this until asked directly later on in the interview process. Many instead, as 
mentioned above, focused only on the functionality of their favorite applications and 
made no mention of politics.  
Finally, my collaborators overwhelmingly pointed out that many native Russian 
social media sites, which have garnered much attention from scholars of the networked 
public sphere, are outdated (Oates, 2013; Etling, et. al., 2014). For example, LiveJournal, 
once the center of the Russian blogging world, is neither used by them nor any of their 
friends. Though Vkontakte is still used, they note that it is only for keeping in contact 
with older relatives, occasionally getting news about domestic affairs in Russia, or 
listening to music. This marks a significant shift from use of these older, largely domestic 
sites, to YouTube, Facebook, Instagram and Telegram.  
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Dialogic Exchange on Social Media 
A key aspect of the networked public sphere is its potential for peer-to-peer 
communication which is comparatively free from state and corporate interests. This 
advantage may promote greater dialogic exchange through use of comment sections, 
sharing posts, and user generated content. Habermas’ description of the public sphere as 
applied to the internet may allow citizens to identify mutually shared interests (Habermas 
1974, 53). Applying this to social media, shared consensus among users, in theory, may 
be identified via debate in comments sections. During my interviews I focused in part on 
my interlocutors’ use of comment sections to see if they were using them to have dialogic 
exchanges about politically-oriented topics. The extant quantitative research indicates 
that such exchanges are rare (Miller et. al. 2015; Pew, 2016). Rather, users often exhibit 
“politically avoidant” behavior on social media. However, especially in Russia, there has 
been little research to show why users are politically avoidant. In an attempt to answer 
this question, this section explores the extent to which my collaborators comment on 
politically-oriented posts and how they interpret discussions in the comments sections. 
 Most of my collaborators identified that debates in comments sections on social 
media are pointless (bessmyslenno). Answers to my interview questions revealed three 
main issues which keep them from engaging in such debates. First, debates usually 
descend into arguments, name calling, and rarely result in productive dialogue. Second, 
they were concerned about  government ‘trolling’ or surveillance. Third, they expressed a 
lack of interest in arguing with strangers. The result is an overall apolitical use of 
comments sections, suggesting limited dialogic potential regarding online interpersonal 
political discourse.  
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Maksim (30, screenwriter) and Nikolai (30, sales account manager) reported that, 
while they used to engage in political debates online when they were younger, they had 
stopped after being involved in heated arguments. Maksim’s told me that, “it is very 
rarely productive… I don’t do this because it ends the same every time… it is like, 
‘you’re a jerk’, ‘no you are… fuck off.’” Nikolai said he had eventually stopped because 
it was pointless to argue with random people on the internet. He doesn’t respect random 
comments from people he does not know, because most of the time such people lack the 
expertise to meaningfully contribute to the subject of discussion. This sentiment was 
echoed by Sofia (23, programmer), who expressed disillusionment with the often 
inflammatory and superficial content she sees in comments sections. As she put it, “often 
people just throw a stick in the water and want to discuss the waves.”  
It is somewhat common, however, for these young adults to have political 
discussions or to share interesting political information in the form of videos or articles 
via messaging applications with friends outside of the ‘virtual’ world. These friends 
either lived in Moscow or some other part of Russia in which my collaborators had 
grown up or spent a significant amount of time. This suggests that, in general, social 
media as a facilitator for political discourse is limited to already established contacts 
based on geographic locales in which my interlocutors had spent a significant amount of 
time.9 
                                                        
9 This use is reminiscent of Stephen Woolgar’s work outlining the “rules of virtuality” which hold that 
online practices serve to supplement other activities, not replace them. In this sense messaging applications 
allow for political discussions which may have been taking place anyway among friends, but are 
supplemented by the ability to communicate across geographic locales and to share multimedia content 
(2009).  
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Ksenia rarely comments or interacts with political information online since, 
“people who are connected to the government browse through that… you’ll go to jail if 
you post stuff that they don’t like… that’s illegal, but you will still go to jail.” Ksenia was 
unique in expressing these trepidations. The fear of government censorship, or even the 
possibility of going to jail did not usually seem to be a concern. Collaborators’ general 
feeling is that online debate is tolerated by the authorities and that, for the most part, 
‘usual’ citizens are able to exercise their right to free speech. Despite this perceived 
freedom, many expressed an awareness of government efforts to misdirect conversations 
in comment sections. However, the efficacy of such attempts was called into question. 
For example, Maksim spoke of the obvious presence of “government trolls” who try to 
coopt conversations in comments sections, but are largely ineffective. According to him 
“you can easily see what is fake… just click on the account and you can see that it is not 
a real person.” 
Due to these misgivings my collaborators generally used discussion sections to 
find out specific information about apolitical events (such as time, location, etc.), not to 
contribute political opinions. Use of comments sections can be characterized as clearly 
utilitarian, with little interest in contributing to drawn-out dialogic exchange in pursuit of 
general consensus. In fact, the cyber-utopian view of social media imbedded in such a 
line of questioning was often met with a chuckle.  
This held true for most of my collaborators with one notable exception. Although 
Nikolai had initially stated that he had stopped participating in political debates online, he 
later qualified this answer. While he has stopped commenting on public posts on 
VKontakte and Facebook, he later said that he prefers to take part in discussions in chat 
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groups, known as “channels” on Telegram. On these channels, which can be public or 
private10, often subscribers become acquainted with one another’s virtual identity 
(everyone has a username and if someone participates in the chat enough, then they 
eventually develop a reputation).11 Nikolai noted that though people from these channels 
have never met each other, they have all been part of the same channel, or collection of 
channels for several years. In Nikolai’s case, these virtual groups consist of about 500-
600 people (though they can vary greatly in size); certain users had gained social 
currency within these groups over months, or sometimes years of posting their opinions. 
Nikolai explained that he knew of certain users in these chat groups who were highly 
respected. He told me, “when you are having a discussion with someone… sometimes 
you think… hey this guy is pretty smart, they speak perfect Russian for example, your 
respect for this person grows, his opinion becomes more important.”  
Nikolai told me that he found these groups through a sort of trial and error 
method, first starting with large groups of about 10,000 people and then branching off to 
smaller groups that he felt were the best fit for him. When I asked him how he chose 
which channels were a good fit, he said, “well I tried some different ones and then found 
one and I was like, ‘this is comfortable,’ people here think like me.” Thus Nikolai has 
been able to find a community with which he is able to have political discussions; this is 
                                                        
10 When setting up these channels, the group administrator (the person who creates the channel) can choose 
whether the group is open to the public, in which case anyone can join, or whether other users need an 
invite from the administrator in order to join. Telegram channels are essentially analogous to an oversized 
group message in which users can write to each other.   
 
11 Users do not have profiles pages on Telegram, but are prompted to add a profile picture and to choose a 
username, which is often a pseudonym. Thus, it is possible to be anonymous or semi-anonymous, if one 
desires.  
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an example of a ‘hug-box’ mentality, in which users “intentionally limit their social 
media connections to likeminded others” (Kruse et. al. 2018, 73). 
 Although collaborators for the most part avoided political discussions on social 
media, a number of them reported that while they do not feel that participating in debates 
on comments sections is useful, they do occasionally read comments. The reason for 
reading comments fell into two main categories. First, it was a way to see what variety of 
opinions exist about potentially controversial topics. For example, Ivan (24, student) 
noted that he “likes to see other opinions and how people are reacting.” Second, it was a 
way to save time and circumvent actually reading articles. A few noted that, in 
combination with the title of the article and the way that people had reacted in the 
comments section, it is possible to deduce its content without actually taking the time to 
read it. It seems to me that this is a way to mitigate the large flow of information present 
online.  
 
Media Bias and Journalism as the ‘Fourth Estate’ 
A central aspect of Habermas’ public sphere is the “rationalization of power 
through the medium of public discussion among private individuals” (Habermas 1974, 
55). In an ideal public sphere, state and corporate interests are in negotiation with the 
citizenry concerning the shape and limitations of their power. In this ideal form the mass 
media should facilitate this negotiation by bringing to public attention key issues which 
are in society’s interest. This role as a mediator between interests is why the press is often 
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referred to as the ‘fourth estate’.12 However, in the Russian context, the press has not 
traditionally filled this role, instead functioning as the ideological arm of the communist 
party during the Soviet era, enjoying limited diversity during the Yelstin era, and again 
becoming increasingly restricted under the Putin regime.  
Instead of acting in the public interest, the press in Russia often acts on behalf of 
private/corporate and government interests. Ledeneva outlines the use of the press for 
what she terms informal Public Relations (PR) (chernyi piar) in influencing elections. 
She sums up the impact of this on efforts to democratize, saying, “in the case of political 
PR, the damage has… implications for the public perception of liberal values, free media, 
and beliefs in principles of democracy” (2006, 36). As noted by De Smaele, journalists in 
Russia often “consider themselves missionaries of ideas rather than neutral observers,” an 
idea largely shared by the public (2007, 1304). This has had an adverse effect on public 
perception of journalism, as often these tactics are brought to light well after their 
intended impacts on elections have taken place, leaving the viewership feeling deceived 
and altogether disillusioned (Ledeneva 2006, 37). The Russian press’s history of 
transgressions raises significant questions relating to the issue of trust in the virtual public 
sphere. Specifically, how can Russians believe what they see or read online? Does the 
decentralized nature of social media and the online space allow them access to alternative 
points of view that they feel are trustworthy?  
To answer these questions I asked how collaborators viewed news received from 
online and social media platforms versus news received from traditional (Kremlin-
                                                        
12 The media as a fourth estate, or “branch” of government, is an idea often credited to British politician 
Edmund Burke. The other estates consist of the judiciary, legislative, and executive powers. By discussing 
the media as the fourth estate, or “branch” Burke was attempting to demonstrate the importance of the press 
in holding the government accountable to its citizens.  
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aligned) media sources. Due to the well-documented fact that media narratives on 
national broadcast television and many, but not all newspapers are controlled either 
directly or indirectly by the Kremlin, I wanted to explore which sources my collaborators 
use on a regular basis.  
Additionally, because the existing literature claims that, in contrast to acting as 
neutral observers, journalists act as political players who represent certain factions of 
Russian society, be they financial or political, I was curious how my collaborators view 
journalism as a profession (Oates 2006, 1285; De Smaele 2007, 1304). Do they feel that 
journalists are trustworthy? Is it a journalist’s job to provide objective, non-biased 
information? I hoped to gain information regarding their view of the press in general and 
whether they conform to the western ideal of the press functioning as the ‘fourth estate’. 
When discussing the difference between social media and traditional, or Kremlin-aligned 
media sources, and the role of journalists, our conversations began to reveal deeper 
insights into how my collaborators try to make meaning of their political reality via a 
diverse array of sources.  
 
Moving Away from Kremlin-Aligned Media 
 
One of the strongest findings from both my personal experience in Moscow and 
my interviews, is that my collaborators have a generally negative view of Kremlin-
aligned news sources, especially broadcast television. These findings are in agreement 
with other qualitative studies which assert that young adults in Moscow have low levels 
of trust in such media sources (Mickiewicz 2014, 110; Szostek 2018, 76). However, these 
studies focused strictly on university students at Moscow’s most prestigious institutions, 
while my sample draws mainly from young professionals who have moved to Moscow 
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after completing their university degrees in various provincial institutions around Russia 
(see figure 1 in the methodology section for a detailed breakdown of demographics). 
Thus, my findings provide new evidence of the increasing decline of the hegemony of 
Kremlin-aligned news sources among young adults in Moscow. 
Maksim, being a bit older than many of my collaborators (30 years old), provided 
insight into his experience with traditional media sources by explaining the Kremlin 
takeover of many of the nation’s top media sources in the early 2000s. He recalled how, 
when he was younger, there was a more diverse collection of traditional media sources 
saying, “yeah I used to watch the news on TV, or read some newspapers… and they all 
died, they changed politically… even if they still exist they aren’t the same.” For this 
reason, he has gravitated toward alternative online sources saying, “the internet is the last 
free thing.” His account was reminiscent of other explanations of the centralization of 
major media sources during this period (Oates 2007, 1283). 
Moving from a reliance on traditional news sources in early life to online sources 
later in life was a common theme. Often my collaborators had spent a significant amount 
of time during their childhoods watching Kremlin-backed television channels such as 
Ren TV, NTV, Rossiia 24, and Pervyi Kanal. Aleksei and Aidar (30, demand planner) 
noted that the news programs Vesti and Vremya, two long-running TV news staples on 
Rossiia 24 and Pervyi Kanal, were fixtures of their childhood. Their families would 
gather to watch the evening news around dinner time, making a point to tune in to these 
long-running programs. As these young adults moved away from home, so too have they 
gravitated away from these nightly rituals. Of course, this trend toward internet news is 
not unique to Russia. The convenience and pervasiveness of the internet means that this 
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shift is global. However, it is still worth exploring the nuances behind why this shift is 
occurring in each of its separate iterations. 
In this instance, the main reason that young adults no longer watch TV is due to 
blatant censorship. Sofia reported, “on TV everything is really strict and there are 
censors… TV news is just for grandmas.” Aleksei also reported this lack of trust in 
traditional media, saying, “in Russia, on television, it is very clear that there are 
censors… but on the internet it is not as evident… no one reads [print] newspapers or 
watches TV anymore.” His main critique is that, “for example, Rossiia 24 is not 
interesting, they only have opinions from one point of view… from those in power.” 
Additionally, although Kremlin-aligned media sources now have a large online presence, 
people still avoid them in favor of alternative sources such as independent bloggers, or 
alternative news outlets found online.   
Aidar was the only person who reported watching broadcast television, but even 
this was limited to mornings just before setting off for work. He and his wife watch the 
show Good Morning (Dobroe Utro) on Pervyi Kanal to see the weather and for some 
“white noise” as they are eating breakfast and getting ready. No one else with whom I 
spoke had even bothered to connect their TVs to the coaxial cables protruding from the 
apartments’ walls. These now lay coiled away, vestigial fixtures of a passing era.  
 
“The Internet is the last free thing” 
 
 My collaborators’ use of news sources largely mirrored quantitative studies which 
show that young adults in Moscow increasingly rely on the internet and social media for 
news (Levada Center, 2018). However, it seems that this increasing use of online sources 
is not necessarily due to the quality of content online, but rather due to the poor quality 
 
 39 
and obvious censorship of traditional media sources. As stated above, Maksim told me 
that he had turned to online sources not necessarily due to their quality, but because “the 
internet is the last free thing”. Interestingly, this quote matches feelings expressed by 
Aleksei Navalny, who indicated that opposition politicians had been forced to use the 
internet because it was their only option (Shuster, 2012). This point of view challenges 
the idea that the internet is acting as a place in which the free flow of ideas is contributing 
to healthy discourse. Instead, it highlights that the internet is a last resort through which 
Russians attempt to formulate some understanding of their political environment.  
This sentiment came up often both directly and indirectly during my interviews. 
Collaborators navigate the online space by treating it as a place in which one may receive 
alternative viewpoints; it is not necessarily a place where one may uncover an undisputed 
truth. The online space is treated with caution. It is a place to observe the perspectives of 
others from a distance, but these opinions are rarely taken too close to heart. Their view, 
perhaps rightfully so, was one of skepticism.  
Perhaps for this reason it was difficult to get direct answers regarding which 
specific sources my collaborators use and trust. Often when I tried to ask which online 
sources in particular they use, they answered indirectly. I suspect that their hesitance to 
answer this question lies in the fact that they are not sure which sources are trustworthy. 
They emphasized the importance of trying to verify information, but pointed out 
that this is a difficult and time-consuming task (one made more difficult by their often 
busy schedules). They often made a point of saying that all news sources have bias and 
that it is important to get a variety of perspectives before coming to a well-reasoned 
conclusion (vezde nado proveriat). Aleksei tries to do this, but acknowledges that he 
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often lacks the time or energy. This answer was repeated often with Marina (23, graphic 
designer) and Svetlana (27, Russian teacher) both saying that they use online sources, but 
that they found it difficult to verify information to make sure it was factual.  
Though it was difficult to find out which specific sources collaborators find 
trustworthy, there was a patterned aversion to sources that are too opposition-oriented 
(slishkom oppozitsionnyi). I specifically asked if they found Dozhd’, which is a popular 
independently-owned online news source, to be trustworthy. More often than not they 
answered with a scrunched nose and a shake of their head, accompanied by a drawn out 
“no”. To them Dozhd seemed to fall too far ‘left’ on the political spectrum. In their eyes 
it propagates western ‘liberal’ agendas. Unfortunately, I did not pursue further 
clarification on this issue. It would be interesting to know what specifically makes my 
collaborators suspicious of this ‘liberal’ agenda. However, I must point out that the 
aversion to this channel contrasts with other answers I received concerning support for 
Alexey Navalny and other opposition politicians. It seems that many are supportive of his 
anticorruption platform, but skeptical of other more socially ‘liberal’ aspects of his 
agenda, such as his support for same-sex marriage (Navalny 2017). 
Maksim expressed this view. He identified the opposition channel Dozhd’ as well 
as the internet in general as the main reason that opposition politicians such as Lyubov’ 
Sobol’ and Aleksei Navalny had been able to gain prominence. Concerning Navalny, 
who has his own successful social media following13, Maksim said, “actually… 
Navalny… who is he? He is no one, just a lawyer who decided ‘let’s think about this’ and 
                                                        
13 As of the writing of this paper Navalny, who posts detailed videos accusing high-profile politicians of 
corruption, has 3.81 million subscribers. His most popular video, which claims that Dmitry Medvedev has 
directed funds from charity foundations to amass a real-estate empire, has garnered 35 million views 
(Aleksei Navalny, 2017).  
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he wrote a lot of blogs about corruption, but he wasn’t a journalist. People believe him 
because he provides evidence that can be checked… now a lot of people are using 
YouTube to report what they see.” In his experience, “all young people (who I know) use 
the same sources, we all watch the same bloggers… we all have a common enemy and 
this helps us to unite.” Though he did not specify who the enemy was, it was clear it was 
those in power (vlast’).  
Due to this nebulous and oversaturated information space in combination with 
their busy lives, many collaborators said they use news aggregators such as Yandex 
News, Yandex Zen, and Tinkoff Journal as their primary news sources. These news 
aggregators, now a common feature both inside and outside of Russia, are mobile 
applications that recommend articles across a wide spectrum of user interests. These 
interests can be identified manually by the user or recommended algorithmically based on 
the type of articles the user has read in the past. When pressed with which specific news 
sources these aggregators recommend, my collaborators were generally unable to say.14 
One answer, which is illustrative of the overall trend of how these aggregators are used, 
was from Aleksei, who said, “to be honest, I am not totally sure of which sources I read 
on these, just if I see something interesting then I will read it.” In a follow-up interview 
with Aleksei, I asked him what he thought of people’s reliance on news aggregators. 
Specifically, I wanted to know if he thought these were a trustworthy way to get news. 
He told me that, while he still does use them due to their convenience, he and his friends 
                                                        
14 In her influential ethnographic account of the impact of the transition from state-run to free-market 
economy, Katherine Verdery notes that one symptom of capitalism is the compression of time (1996, 35). 
This compression is at the center of improving the system. I interpret this reliance on news aggregators as 
one such symptom manifest in the information space. It is ultimately a time-saving device for career-
oriented individuals, but one that may come at the cost of choosing news sources with any real rigor. 
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had started to notice an absence of articles which reflect poorly on the federal 
government on the Yandex News aggregator. 
Aidar was able to tell me about a few specific bloggers whom he trusts because 
their public reputation is connected to the quality of information they share. He prefers to 
“see opinions from those with authoritative knowledge... to see how knowledgeable 
bloggers think about the news.” I took this opportunity to ask him how he defines those 
with “authoritative knowledge”, to which he responded, “well, those such as Dmitry 
Gordon15, a well-known TV-presenter who has guests on his show to discuss current 
events”. He went on to explain that through this show he had found other bloggers, 
mainly interesting people who had been guests on Dmitry Gordon’s show. One such 
blogger was Konstantin Syomin16 who has his own YouTube channel, Agitation and 
Propaganda, has influenced Aidar’s current perspective of the political environment. He 
is able to place trust in such people because their opinions seem to be based upon facts, 
and their manner of speaking is clear and somewhat infectious. He pointed out, “you start 
to use the same idioms as these people, to speak like them. However, he qualified this 
statement about their infectious speech by saying, “you know, it often sounds really good, 
but in reality you don’t really know what you are talking about.” 
 
 
                                                        
15 Dmitry Gordon is a Ukrainian journalist, author, blogger, and musician. In May 2019 he announced his 
departure from the privately-owned 112 Ukraine TV station to pursue his YouTube channel.  
 
16 Konstantin Syomin is a Russian journalist, blogger, and musician who, between 2000-2019 hosted a 
variety of news programs on Kremlin-aligned television channels such as Russia-24 and worked as a 
correspondent for the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK). In 2019 he 
left Russia-24 citing dissatisfaction with the scheduling of his program early in the morning or late at night; 
he discussed domestic political issues.  
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The role of journalists 
A critical element of the press is the individuals who report the stories. Within the 
Moscow context, how do young adults view journalism as a profession? In my 
interviews, although many identified the ‘objective’ presentation of facts as an ideal for 
journalists, this is not how they believe journalists behave in practice. The reasons for this 
departure from journalistic ethics varied, but generally centered around structural 
constraints imposed by the government in the form of censorship, or by the nature of for-
profit media in the form of “attention-grabbing” or “infotainment.” 
Svetlana (Russian teacher, 27), who received her master’s degree in journalism 
and interned at a TV station in Moscow briefly, described a jarringly negative view of 
established journalistic institutions in Russia. After her short-lived experience in the 
industry, she became disillusioned and decided to pursue another career path. She did not 
say specifically where she had worked, but indicated that she had left because only 
stories showing the government in a positive light were allowed to get air time.  
Alexei pointed to structural issues at both the private and government sectors as 
reasons for his general lack of trust in journalists, saying, “ideally journalists should 
present the facts, but in Russia it is hard to do this for political reasons… I believe that 
any journalist can be bought.” He feels that it is not a journalist’s job to provide the most 
important stories to the public, or to serve the public interest, but to “write stories that get 
people talking.” 
Maksim and Sofia, while acknowledging these structural constraints, took a 
different view altogether. They questioned the very possibility of objective journalism. 
For these two, objectivity in journalism was an impossible ideal. Sofia said that ideally, 
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yes, journalists should strive to tell the truth, but that this is actually impossible. She 
explained, “well the term truth is very subjective… I would like journalists to provide my 
truth, but that is only one side of the story”.  Anton stopped short of such a broad 
postmodern critique, preferring journalists who are principled and who admit when they 
have made mistakes. He says they “should be able to change their positions… if they say 
‘I yeah I fucked up’ then yeah I think that is good… they just have to be principled.” 
 
Silicon Valley and Liberal Bias 
 
Perhaps the most intriguing perceived limitation of the networked public sphere, 
as identified by Maksim, Aidar, and Nikolai, centers around the implicit ideological bias 
of American social media platforms. All three were 30 years old during the time of the 
interviews and provided insight into how they feel social media has changed for the 
worse in recent years. They identify as staunchly pro-freedom of speech, even if this 
speech is not ‘politically correct’. To them social media should function as an open 
platform for all ideas, not just those deemed acceptable by elites working in “Silicon 
Valley.”  
Maksim pointed out that, for him, social media has evolved from its original use – 
maintaining personal social networks such as friends and family, to “something much 
bigger…more like something where they change content that you can see… it has 
editors.” To these three young men, social media has ceased operating as an open 
platform and is increasingly censored by a liberal17 agenda born of, if I summarize their 
                                                        
17 Liberal here refers to the American democratic party, not to be confused with classical liberalism.  
 
 
 45 
thoughts on the matter, the self-righteousness of Silicon Valley and the American 
political ‘left’ in general. Due to its location in primarily democrat-leaning California and 
proximity to San Francisco, in combination with the fact that social media companies 
consist primarily of liberal employees18, they feel that these companies censor 
conservative viewpoints.  
In recent years such censorship has become a common talking point among 
American conservatives. There have been allegations from republican politicians 
(including Donald Trump) that social media companies perform ‘shadow banning’ on 
conservative American politicians’ accounts. Shadow banning is when social media 
companies adjust their algorithm so that certain accounts are no longer recommended to 
other users. In this way, the user becomes essentially invisible to everyone else, without 
being outright banned or noticing any other changes to their account. However, there has 
been no evidence that social media companies perform such bans (Stack 2018). These 
three young men follow American politics quite closely and have found resonance with 
these allegations from conservative figures in some form or another.  
Maksim told me that he uses social media to “live in his own personal virtual 
exile” and that he tries to ignore politics in Russia. He thinks the situation is too 
depressing and that it will simply never change. Instead he chooses to focus on American 
and European politics. When I met him for our interview he was listening to a Tim Pool 
podcast while playing some iteration of the Need for Speed gaming franchise on his 
PlayStation 4. Pool, a favorite of Maksim’s is an independent American journalist who 
                                                        
18 Social media companies such as Twitter do hire primarily ‘liberal’ employees, something CEO Jack 
Dorsey has admitted could be problematic (Vox 2018).  
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came to prominence on YouTube, Twitter, and other social media platforms; in recent 
years, Pool has claimed that conservatives are censored on social media (Al Jazeera 
2019). Pool markets himself as an objective, fact-based journalist, something that appeals 
to Maksim. However, Pool’s self-professed objectivity has been called into question. He 
is often criticized for his framing and choice of certain issues, such as his coverage of 
illegal immigration linked to increased rates of violent crime in Sweden and his giving 
interviews to alt-right groups such as Baked Alaska and the Proud Boys (Marantz 2017). 
 I asked Maksim why he personally felt this liberal bias existed on social media, 
to which he answered, “well it is because of the culture war… on the edge of this it is like 
the second American civil war… like for example it is not a crime to think that 
transgender athletes shouldn’t participate in women’s sports19, but if you say this then 
Twitter will ban you.” His comment was reminiscent of other public figures who are 
commonly associated with the alt-right such as Jordan Peterson and Ben Shapiro (though 
these two claim that associations with the alt-right are unfair). They both believe that the 
state does not have the authority to compel citizens to use gender pronouns which differ 
from and individual’s gender which was determined at birth. They tend to frame this 
issue as an attack on individual freedom of speech by a coercive state (Jordon B. Peterson 
2017). Peterson came to prominence thanks in part to this very issue. While working as a 
professor at the University of Toronto he refused to comply with the Canadian Bill C-16, 
                                                        
19 Transgender women participating in women’s sports with those who have always identified as women has 
become a contentious issue in America during the past few years. Supporters note that it is not fair to 
discriminate against these athletes and keep them from participating, while those opposed claim that 
transgender women have an unfair physical advantage (Guardian 2020). Regarding Maksim’s comment, I 
have not been able to find evidence that Twitter has banned users due to their opinion on this issue. 
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which he argues compels individuals to use appropriate gender pronouns. Such arguments 
have found resonance with young men in Russia.  
Maksim stopped short of saying that bias was the result of some consciously 
crafted conspiracy of social media CEOs, rather, he claims that it is an inadvertent side 
effect of liberal bias in company policy. He rejects what he sees as censorship of certain 
points of view and types of speech because such attempts are reminiscent of the 
ideological vanguardism of the communist party. He told me, “here in Russia we have 
tried limiting what is acceptable to say and to me American liberals and progressives are 
now trying the same thing.”  
Aidar shared this perception of liberal bias, but his reservations contained 
considerably more conspiratorial undertones. He observes that, “when you set up your 
account, for some reason there are these political bloggers who are recommended to 
you… for example on YouTube Navalny is recommended right away… I don’t know 
who decides this.” So, he claims, while it does connect people from different parts of the 
world and provide outside opinions, there seems to be an emphasis on liberal content. He 
notes that, “it seems to me there is someone behind these recommendations who wants to 
mold our point of view… you can never see stuff about communism, what I believe, at 
the top… at the top there are just [western] liberal ideas.” Aidar is a supporter of the 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) whose leader, Gennady Zyuganov, is 
known for accusing Navalny of accepting funding from western intelligence agencies 
such as the CIA (BBC 2015). In a 2013 press conference, Zyuganov criticized the 
Kremlin for releasing Navalny, who had been arrested for organizing an unsanctioned 
protest, after only one night in jail. As part of this criticism Zyuganov stated, “I have a 
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feeling that there are two factions in the Kremlin, one of which works with American 
intelligence agencies through Navalny” (Kolesova 2013).20 Thus, it seems that Aidar’s 
lived experience of social media is imbued with meaning according to his already 
existing political beliefs. 
Nikolai, also feeling that there is liberal bias on American social media sites, 
increasingly seeks anonymity online. This anonymity allows him to express his true 
thoughts, without risking his personal reputation, as often his opinions are not “politically 
correct” as he puts it. He noted that social media is a very important part of his life. It is a 
virtual space in which he can be himself, where “people can give you the warmth of their 
hearts without being there.” He remembers life before the prevalence of social media and 
said, “before [social media] I was sitting at home a lot … like, where are my friends?” 
From our interactions, it seems that he has used social media to build a virtual 
community. He has been able to make these contacts primarily on 4Chan, a web forum 
that has gained notoriety for its laissez faire attitude to hate speech, and Telegram. It is 
noteworthy that his presence on these platforms dates back 10 years and 5 years, 
respectively. He identified that, especially on Telegram, he has been able to find a 
community through joining various channels. Personally, he uses only his username and 
enjoys this anonymity as it allows him to avoid judgement.  
Over time he has been able to gain social capital on these chats solely on the basis 
of his knowledge and opinions. The anonymity of these sites allows him to hide his 
                                                        
20 In November 2019, shortly after I concluded my interviews, Navalny’s organization was declared a 
“foreign agent” by a Moscow Municipal Court. This is part of controversial restrictions on non-
governmental organizations which officially seek to reduce foreign influence in domestic Russian politics, 
but is widely cited as a pretense for limiting the financial resources of civil society organizations 
(Tikhomirov 2019).  
 
 49 
“professional appearance.” Much like the other two collaborators, he pointed out that he 
was fearful of social justice warriors online who threatened to “destroy people’s lives and 
careers without due process.” As an example he pointed out Kevin Spacey,21 saying, “he 
was really famous before all this stuff happened to him… he was found not guilty, but his 
career was destroyed.” He feels that now “everybody is watching everybody” and that 
this is “like fascist propaganda in Germany… even if someone hacks your account and 
posts something horrible, most people will still think it was you.” For him, social media’s 
power is in its ability to unite people. However, this is also its main drawback.  
I noticed both during my interviews and my time living in Russia that in general 
Russians are weary of liberals (liberaly) and certain movements that aim to promote 
human rights, specifically those relating to feminism and LGBTQ communities. This 
may be due to the Kremlin’s increasing reliance on conservative rhetoric, which often 
frames the West as a place of moral decay and a “haven for homosexuality and 
pedophilia” while Russia is framed as the defender of Judeo-Christian values 
(Makarychev and Medvedev 2015, 45).  
One example of such framing comes from a 2019 broadcast of the popular nightly 
news program Vesti at 10:00 P.M. (Vesti v 22:00). The host, Alexei Kazakov reported on 
the recent closure of a ‘feminist café’ in Saint Petersburg, which he claims was inspired 
by such cafés in Australia. During the segment introduction, Kazakov, with a seemingly 
objective and disinterested air, gave an account of the café’s closure and its practice of 
“charging men eighteen percent higher than women” in an effort to address the wage gap 
                                                        
21 Starting in 2017 American actor Kevin Spacey faced a number of sexual assault allegations, which were 
shared widely on various social media platforms. Due to these allegations Spacey has been removed from 
current and future roles in the entertainment industry (BBC 2019).  
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between men and women. However, the segment was spliced with interviews from 
former customers who variously describe their experience at the restaurant as unpleasant 
due to slow service, low quality of food, and “waitresses who gave off an unpleasant 
smell” (istochali nepriiatnyi zapakh). Additionally, they interviewed a restaurant critic 
who dismissed the idea of such feminist cafés as a marketing ploy meant to “catch the 
eye of interested customers” (mozhno privlech’ klientov iskluchitel’no interesnyi na 
vzglad zadymkoy). Thus the program and its host, while not explicitly taking a position, 
nonetheless clearly conveyed the a multifaceted message: feminists are rude, incapable of 
running a business, and smell bad. Additionally, including that such cafés were inspired 
by others in Australia, there is an implicit connection with such liberal ideas seeping in 
from a morally corrupt ‘liberal’ West. Finally, as evidenced by the higher prices they 
must pay, the segment conveys the idea that such cafés are part of a continuing attack on 
men (Rossiia 24, 2019).  
While my interlocutors reported that they mainly avoid Kremlin-backed channels, 
there is evidence that young adults in Moscow may passively absorb such Kremlin 
narratives despite seeking information from a diverse array of sources (Szostek 2018, 80). 
Perhaps passive exposure may explain their predisposition to discount movements which 
are associated with ‘liberals’.  
This weariness of ‘liberals’ also manifests as suspicion of the #metoo movement 
and western society’s condemnation of males in positions of power who are suspected of 
sexual abuse.22 I asked Natalia what she thought of the #metoo movement and its 
                                                        
22 The #metoo movement is a widespread voicing and recognition of the experiences of sexual abuse that 
many women have during their lifetime. Although it has not taken hold  strongly in Russia, my 
collaborators have been watching these events unfold in America via social media.  
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prevalence on social media. Her initial reaction was one of distrust, telling me “people lie 
about these types of things, there is no way to know if they are telling the truth.” 
However, she did recognize that often women’s voices often go unheard. After thinking 
for some time, she characterized her view as “mostly distrustful of the way that people’s 
careers and reputations are destroyed,” but that she thought it was important that the 
conversation was getting started.  
In addition to perhaps unknowingly being influenced by Kremlin narratives, 
perhaps their suspicion of the #metoo movement is a reaction to the character 
assassinations (the Chernyi Piar mentioned earlier) undertaken in the 1990s and early 
2000s. Ledeneva details such takedowns of political or business opponents which she 
calls ‘informal PR’ or ‘kompromat’. Those involved in kompromat made up an entire 
industry of journalists and media outlets that were effectively “for sale” (Ledeneva 2006, 
35). Russian citizens often became aware of such character assassinations after their 
desired impact had already taken place, resulting in a lack of trust in such stories (41). 
According to one of Ledeneva’s respondents who used to work in the kompromat 
industry, “a fact from the past, such as a criminal record, can be used… however in the 
absence of facts or documents, anything will do, a lie, or even better, a half-truth” (76). 
She notes that such tactics eventually became ineffective toward the end of the 90’s 
because of the extent of their use (77). Russians no longer paid much attention to such 
attacks.  
In this case, perhaps it is the decentralized nature of social media that make them 
suspicious of such movements, as anyone could, in theory, fabricate stories which could 
then be circulated widely and used to destroy people’s reputations. In the case of the 
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#metoo movement, it is possible that my collaborators treat these stories as another type 
of kompromat, a way for competing factions of businessmen or politicians to effectively 
end people’s careers, something they are all too familiar with from their country’s recent 
past. 
 
Trust and Political Change 
As discussed earlier, one of the core functions of the public sphere (and now the 
networked public sphere) is in the rationalization of power to private citizens through 
public debate and eventual consensus. An additional function is in its power for 
organization and collective action. Due to the potential for low-cost user-generated 
content, social media is often touted for its ability to promote horizontal communication 
among like-mined people who can then organize around shared conceptions of positive 
political change (Enikolopov et. al. 2015, 2). Thus, a central role of the networked public 
sphere may lie in its ability to foster social movements which culminate in political 
change.  I spoke with most of my collaborators about this potential, but framed the 
question as “do you feel that social media could help promote positive change in 
Russia?” 
Many reported that social media is powerless against the interests of the Russian 
state. Any kind of major systemic change, to them, seemed to be near impossible. For 
example, Maksim noted that, “just because you have some iPhone and an application 
does not mean you can argue with military power… these people, they are not going to 
give up their power.” For him, Russia lacks the democratic institutions to realize any 
substantial political change due to online discourse or organization.  
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Additionally, there was an underlying feeling that protest, or those who took part 
in protest movements, betrayed their national identity as Russians. For example, Natalia 
(26, athlete) pointed to her mom’s opinion that protest went against her “Russianness.” 
She told me, “when I was younger and we would see something bad [about Russia] on 
TV, my mom would say, Russians are patient, we sit and we wait… we do not protest.” 
She explained to me that, many Russians think “it will be like it was in the 90’s… when 
those people took power… they see the protesters and think, ‘no you’ll spoil 
everything!’” However, she went on to say, “but before there wasn’t a platform for these 
people to organize on… now they can talk and agree that they are against certain 
things… then they can go to the protests.” Although she did identify this potential, 
Natalia chose not to get involved in politics and even partially agreed with her mom’s 
assessment that protesting defied her ‘Russianness’. She described herself as apolitical 
and preferred to focus on more utilitarian issues in her life like financial well-being and 
success in her profession.  
Such condemnation of protest is common. Natalia’s answer offers a few 
possibilities as to why this is the case. Perhaps the most likely explanation relates to past 
experiences of rapid societal change. Natalia referred to the “90s… when ‘those’ people 
took power,” a nod to the economic failures of the Yeltsin period and rapid attempts to 
privatize the economy known as “shock therapy”. This transition, largely seen as 
mismanaged and unsuccessful, left many Russians in a desperate situation which they 
saw as “the darkest nightmare in living history” (Trudolyubov 2014). As Verdery put it, 
this turbulent and rushed transition which took place at nearly all levels of life was a time 
of “too much shock, too little therapy” (1996, 10). If there is one uniting belief in modern 
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Russia it is a dislike of Yeltsin and a desire never to return to the economic and general 
societal failures of the 90s. This experience, according to Natalia’s answer, is still 
influencing the way the Russians, even young adults, view protest. Thus, even though the 
networked public sphere may offer a space for increased organization of those opposed to 
the Kremlin’s policies, the experiences of the past limits their perceptions of the efficacy 
of protest.  
While largely avoiding protest, many collaborators stated that they knew of 
examples of the government being held accountable for specific grievances. They pointed 
out that, while any major change seemed impossible, it was possible to garner support for 
specific, targeted issues. Svetlana said, “if we talk to people about these problems and 
coordinate their efforts… if someone writes about a problem and sends it to someone 
who can solve it then yes, social media can help… but there will not be some kind of 
drastic change.”  
Ksenia pointed to the recent imprisonment of a Russian investigative journalist 
working for Meduza as a concrete issue that was unifying people (Novaya Gazeta 2019). 
She said, “people do unite for some things to create change… like everyone knows that 
Golunov is innocent… now we see a lot of stuff about him on social media.” This case 
did indeed garner widespread support for Ivan Golunov, who was later released after a 
Moscow police officer admitted to planting drugs in his apartment (BBC 2019).  
 
2019 protests 
 
The final section of my interviews was a response to largely unexpected protests, 
which allowed for a more targeted approach to how my collaborators perceived specific 
politically-charged events through social media. In the summer of 2019, the run up to the 
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quintennial Moscow City Duma elections became mired in controversy. Several 
opposition candidates, despite having gained enough signatures to be on the ballot, were 
denied entry by the city election commission on the grounds that the signatures were 
fraudulent. These claims were largely refuted by the Moscow public, resulting in large-
scale protests. I asked a handful of questions to understand how my collaborators viewed 
these protests. Specifically, I asked if they had any acquaintances who posted information 
about the protests, how they had received information about the protests, and if they had 
seen information on social media that had changed their opinions about the protests. We 
then discussed their views on political opposition members such as Alexei Navalny and 
Lyubov Sobol’. This section was undoubtedly the most productive in terms of the 
interplay between social media and politics. Namely, answers seemed to uncover limits to 
the use of social media for garnering widespread support due to entrenched suspicions of 
politicians and those who seek political power.  
When I taught in Moscow I often worked with middle managers with high 
proficiency in English. Our lessons were as much language maintenance as language 
learning. We often set aside the recommended textbooks in favor of discussing articles 
from sources such as the Economist, the New Yorker, and the Atlantic. It was exciting for 
both me and my students, as we could exchange often diverging views on pertinent 
topics. One student, a business manager at the Moscow headquarters for a European 
coffee company, whom we will call Stanislav (Slava for short), stands out to me from this 
time, as he always had such grounded and practical insights.  
 It was spring of 2018 and Telegram had just been banned by the government. 
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov justified this ban to the public because the 
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application, due to its end-to-end encryption of messages, was used by a terrorist group to 
bomb the Saint Petersburg metro that year. The government, they argued, was unable to 
prevent the bombing because they could not gain access to the messages.  
I was curious what Slava’s thoughts were on the matter, so I asked during one of 
our lessons. He told me that yes, he disagreed with the ban, but that he thought, in 
actuality, the CEO of Telegram, Pavel Durov, was working with the Kremlin. He 
explained that since the ban, the popularity of the application had soared and that, in his 
opinion, it was a clever bit of PR work. Now, I have my doubts about whether or not this 
is true, but it nonetheless provides an example of patterns of mistrust which I encountered 
while living in Russia. My friend Aleksei said he thinks that since this time Durov has 
worked out an agreement with the Kremlin to provide encryption keys so that messages 
can be deciphered and read by the federal government. These conspiratorial accounts 
point to a key issue in Russian society: lack of trust and suspicion of those in power. 
When I was living in Moscow, I continually heard the phrase, “oh, it’s politics, 
Kyle, you understand?” (note that politika is the Russian word for both politics and 
policy). The general feeling that I had when moving back to America was that many 
Russians are apolitical. Instead they feel it is more productive to focus on utilitarian 
issues, to concentrate on that which is within one’s control. Based on the results from my 
interviews, it seems that this predisposition to suspicion of those either in or seeking 
political office manifests as either apathy to or disillusionment with politics and political 
movements. This is a critical cultural insight when discussing the public sphere, as it 
shows that while Russians do interact with political information online, it is usually not 
 
 57 
done so with the intention of trying to influence the political system in some way. 
Instead, staying informed about current events is more a matter of “personal utility.”23 
 Although all of my collaborators, with the exception of Sofia, noted that they first 
heard about the protests on social media, none indicated that their opinions of prominent 
opposition members had been changed by information from social media. Rather, they 
view protest as a recurring trend, a continual battle between the oppositionists and those 
in power. A recurring answer to this question is best summarized by Aidar, who said, “I 
kind of knew the opinions they have and so I am not interested when some kind of 
‘Navalny’ goes on social media and says something that he has been saying for the past 
ten years.” From my findings and general experience in Russia, Navalny’s opposition 
platform is already well known among young adults in Russia, so these aspiring 
politicians backing a new wave of protests was nothing new. The protests were 
something of a background noise for my interlocutors, a recurrent part of their lives that 
may make headlines for a few weeks, may shut down a few city blocks for a while, but 
that would then fade without the materialization of any substantial change.  
 This feeling of detachment from the protests is best exemplified by an answer 
from Sofia, who is quite career-oriented and spends a lot of time on the computer and 
social media for work. When she gets home she just wants to occupy her time with other 
activities and to disconnect from social media. Her first knowledge of the protests came 
when she was on a walk with her boyfriend. She recalled seeing a large crowd of people 
running on the historic Sukharevskaia street. At first she thought, “oh look there is a 
                                                        
23 This finding largely reflects those of Ellen Mickiewicz’s work on TV news and viewership in the Russian 
Federation. Through a collection of focus groups in different cities in Russia she found that news is “for 
personal utility – to be better prepared for unexpected changes in the political and economic environment” 
(Mickiewicz 2008, 22).  
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running event… and the police are with them to clear the way, but shortly after I saw 
OMON beating a young man and realized something wasn’t right.” The way she recalled 
this was quite casual. It didn’t seem to have made an impression on her, but was rather 
just another thing happening in the city that day.  
 Another trend adds depth to this point of view and suggests an overall pessimism 
in regard to those who seek political power. I asked specifically how my collaborators 
viewed opposition politicians who were attempting to run for city council. Many reported 
a distrust in those who seek political office. This lack of trust is one of the biggest 
roadblocks in the networked public sphere, as it seems that often my collaborators were 
willing to support ideals more than actual people trying to influence politics. While many 
reported being sympathetic to the causes supported by protesters, they stopped short of 
supporting oppositionists.  
For Aleksei, it did not matter if the oppositionists claimed they were trying to 
change Russia for the better. To him, “almost any politician trying to get power is 
working for themselves.” Although many of my collaborators have identified that they 
avoid Kremlin-backed news sources in favor of alternative online sources, it seems that 
once people seek political office, they cross the line from ‘disinterested’ provider of 
information, to self-interested politician. This sentiment was echoed a handful of times 
with Svetlana saying, “I think that most of them are there for money or status.” Nikolai 
also reported that he did not support the protests due to a lack of faith in the motives of 
the leadership, however his reason was slightly different. He said that he does not know 
who exactly is “standing behind these protests” and that he “doesn’t want to be a man 
who fights for another man’s interests because he doesn’t know what these interests are.” 
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This lack of trust has deep historical roots. In Bukovskii’s 1981 Letters From a 
Russian Traveler he writes, “we know that they [the Soviet government] always want to 
deceive us, and because of this we seek deception in everything” (1981, 43). More 
recently, with the fall of the Soviet Union, Nancy Ries points to the undoing of numerous 
societal myths put forth by the Communist Party. She explains that the fall of the Soviet 
Union made two paradoxes apparent to Russians – “the first was the paradox of the 
Soviet state and its massive internal contradictions; the second… was the paradox of 
perestroika and all [its] unintended consequences and disappointments” (169). During 
perestroika, information previously unavailable to the public such as were suddenly open 
to critique and become a dominant the discourse in the media. According to Ries, “the 
broad airing of these truths became a dominant mode of public discourse” which 
“reinforced social cleavages, deepened political apathy, and intensified a sense of despair 
and futility” (1996, 166-168).  
Such feelings of political apathy and mistrust have continued and go deeper than 
public discourse. This is demonstrated by Caroline Humphrey’s accounts of the Russian 
Mafia and widespread use of personal protection rackets (2002, 100). She details 
preference for personal protection rackets from the mafia in the 90’s over reliance on the 
powers of enforcement of the comparatively weak Russian state. In this sense, a rejection 
of state services was a rational choice simply because such rackets were “more efficient 
than the state” (2002, 100). Though the influence of the mafia has declined in recent 
years, this rejection of the use of the state as means of personal protection is 
demonstrative of the lack of trust Russians have in their state institutions. 
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However, not all reported complete distrust of those seeking political power. 
Maksim and Ksenia both supported the motives of oppositionists such as Navalny and 
Sobol’. To Maksim, these people are martyrs who risk their personal safety to try and 
change something in Russia. He noted that, “they have a lot of courage… they are 
crazy… you risk everything when you do this.” He believes that they are heroes standing 
for an idealistic cause, but pointed out that he doubted they would change anything in the 
country. Ksenia was the most politically active of any of my collaborators and was the 
only one who purposefully went to protests. She noted that she had been inspired by the 
level of organization of the Hong Kong protesters, which she had seen on the YouTube 
channel Satire without Positive (Satir Bez Positiva). She felt that YouTube channels such 
as this had helped her to figure out what was actually going on in the city and to see how 
protesters had been mistreated by OMON, the Moscow riot police.  
 
They Can Turn it Off 
 The final note I would like to make about the protests comes from my experience 
in Moscow.  It reveals an additional limitation of the networked public sphere, or, rather, 
the dangers of relying on social media as a force for organization and communication. I 
had been in the city for a few weeks and one of my friends asked me to accompany him 
for a small gig in a stylized simulacrum of an early 1920’s American speak-easy. I play 
some guitar and was familiar with his songs, so agreed. However, I ended up being about 
an hour late because my phone suddenly lost connection to the data network. No internet, 
no phone calls, just a glorified iPod touch. What could it be? My pre-paid balance was 
full, the battery was full, I frantically turned the phone on and off, but it still wouldn’t 
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connect. I couldn’t connect to my maps application to find were the gig was located. I 
tried asking a few people if they knew where the place was, but no one was familiar. 
Using my phone was the only way I could find the place.  
While rushing around what I thought was the general location of the bar, popping 
in and out of corridors and courtyards (podezdy), I started to notice the growing numbers 
of policemen on nearly every corner. It was suddenly clear what was happening. The 
government had shut off cellular data in a part of the city where there was a planned 
protest. This suspicion was confirmed both by Nikolai during our interview and later by 
several media reports. I, in my own small way, experienced a crucial choke point of the 
normalization of the internet as means for organizing protest (or, in my case, something 
rather common like finding a pub). That’s the irony -- all over the world we are getting 
used to the convenience of telecommunications, but they can be switched off deliberately.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
I have attempted to show aspects of everyday use of social media and the internet 
and how the networked public sphere is influenced by key cultural and historical themes 
in Russia. My collaborators’ daily use is utilitarian and based upon maintaining existing 
social connections, while also occasionally checking in with either Russian friends who 
have moved abroad, or international friends. Though access to the internet is widespread 
and these Muscovites interact with a diverse array of media sources for news political 
information, its use as an alternative public sphere is constrained by a number of factors.  
Exploring one of the central aspects of the networked public sphere, the potential 
for peer to peer interaction, I have found that such dialogic exchange is generally limited 
to already existing friend groups. By asking about my collaborators’ use of comments 
sections to facilitate political discussions, I determined that arguing with strangers online 
is seen as mostly unproductive and rarely, if ever, resulted in coming to a shared 
agreement. Rather, such exchanges usually devolved into name-calling or personal 
attacks unrelated to the original topic of discussion. There was some fear of government 
surveillance and ‘trolling’ of comments sections, however this was not a central concern 
for most of my collaborators. 
Regarding Kremlin-backed media, my findings indicate that young adults in 
Moscow have turned away from traditional media, preferring online sources such as 
bloggers and news aggregators. This pivot to online news has allowed them a relatively 
diverse media repertoire. Despite this change and the largely unrestricted nature of the 
Russian internet, there was evidence that it is difficult for my interlocutors to locate 
trustworthy sources. This was evidenced by their reluctance, or perhaps inability, to 
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identify which specific sources they find reliable. When they do rely on the internet for 
their news, it allows them greater access to political opinions, but information 
encountered online is treated with caution. In this sense, the internet is not a place in 
which they feel they can uncover some undisputed truth. Instead it is a space they feel 
they must navigate with some skepticism, often feeling the need to verify information if 
possible. However, this ability to verify information is constrained by the sheer amount 
of information present online as well as their busy schedules.  
Journalism is generally not viewed as a ‘fourth estate’ as it often is in the West, 
mediating between the interests of the state, corporate interests, and the public. Rather, 
the media is viewed more as a political player which is constrained by structural 
limitations. These limitations were identified in both the corporate, profit-driven nature of 
the media, as well as constraints in the form of censorship from the federal government. 
Additionally, professional journalists are often regarded with some suspicion, with my 
collaborators often saying that they feel journalists self-censor or simply publish stories 
which garner the most views.   
Regarding American media sources, three of my collaborator’s explained that 
they feel liberal bias is imbedded in the American social media platforms they use. This 
view seems to be shaped by both domestic news stories, American conservative 
politicians they follow, and independent journalists and academics who frame certain 
social-justice causes, such as transgender rights and feminism, as an attack on 
masculinity and free speech. However, I note that this view is not shared by all of my 
collaborators. In my follow-up interview with Aleksei, he completely disagreed with the 
contention that liberal bias exists in American social media. 
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Finally, I pointed out that the upheaval of the 1990s has led to the breakdown of 
societal trust in governmental institutions. Such a breakdown in trust impacts 
collaborators’ view of protest and politicians. This makes it less likely for them to 
organize or take part in protests, despite the possibility of being able to organize online. 
Further, the failure of the promises of both communism and capitalism makes them 
suspicious and doubtful of the possibility of substantial societal change. Instead, they feel 
that it is more productive to focus on utilitarian issues that are within their control.  
At first glance parts of this account may seem bleak. There are tendencies to be 
suspicious of many different actors and sources of information. These young adults are 
quite critical of government sources, yet they hesitate to support Russian opposition 
sources, and a few doubts the openness of American social media sources. They often 
turn inward and become apolitical, or in some cases turn to conspiracy theories. They are 
hesitant to take political action and can be suspicious of politicians or opposition 
members who do try and change the status quo. Because of these themes, one may walk 
away from this manuscript with doubts regarding the democratizing potential of the 
networked public sphere in Russia. This would be partially correct, however, in closing 
there are a few matters which may assuage such doubts. 
My sample may be unrepresentative of the entirety of young adults in Moscow. 
From a methodological standpoint, my sample consisted mainly of young professionals. 
The conclusions from a sample focusing on a different sector of Moscow society, such as 
an activist group, would likely be completely different. These young adults, often having 
moved to Moscow from provincial towns, have worked hard and found early success in 
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competitive business environments. Perhaps this career-oriented mindset frames their use 
of the networked public sphere, making it more utilitarian and apolitical.  
I also want to point out that my collaborators show undercurrents of curiosity, 
open-mindedness, and an admirable commitment to self-improvement. There is a feeling 
that they are looking to the future. While this is evident in terms of their career ambitions, 
there is also a keen commitment to expanding their understanding of the world. Much of 
this learning takes place online and would not be as accessible without this space. They 
are asking questions about their political situation and actively trying to make sense of it, 
even if this does at times result in spurious or even conspiratorial conclusions. Although 
the political situation in the country is difficult, I would not say that my interlocutors feel 
hopeless or completely resigned to their current reality. Their curiosity is expressed by a 
desire for a diversity of opinions in their news and political information. Though this 
does, as mentioned, manifest as a weariness of “political correctness” which they 
associate with censorship, it is equally born of a desire for open and unrestricted dialogue 
about societal issues.  
My final point is that perhaps aspects of their recent past have prepared them for 
this current “social media” moment. As discussed, the Russian press, rather than working 
for the interests of the public, has represented the interests of ideological or private gain 
in support of a particular political candidate or businessperson. This history of 
misinformation has prepared them for some of the challenges now facing the world in the 
age of social media. Their experiences may be, to use the Russian idiom, a bit of a ‘two 
sided stick’. This leads at times to cynicism and detachment from political life, but it also 
leads to an acute awareness of the structural constraints of the mass media and even 
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social media. One of my key informants, Aleksei even expressed interest in looking at 
more non-profit media sources in order to eschew such constraints. An often repeated 
phrase during my interviews was “you always need to verify” (vezde nado proveriat). My 
collaborators are, perhaps, more aware of these constraints than average Americans, 
many of whom still digest partisan media with little skepticism. Of any criticism that 
could be leveled at these Russians, they could certainly not be called naïve.  
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APPENDIX: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
English Version 
Section 1: Written Answers 
 
1.1 Demographics 
 
Age Gender length of 
Residence 
in Moscow 
Place of 
Birth 
Occupation Highest 
Level of 
Education 
      
 
 
1.2 Determining Sources of Information 
 
• Indicate how much time you spend consuming news daily. 
 
• Choose from the categories below to indicate where you get your news. Write the 
answer as a percentage of total time spent consuming news over the course of a 
day. 
o Internet 
o Broadcast Television 
o Friends, acquaintances, and relatives 
o Newspapers 
o Books 
 
1.3 Preference of Social Media Sites 
 
• Indicate how much time you spend on social media daily. 
 
• Of your total daily time spent on social media, indicate which percentage of your 
time you spend on each site.  
o VK 
o Instagram 
o Facebook 
o Odnoklassniki  
o YouTube 
o Telegram 
o Viber 
o WhatsApp 
o Twitter 
o Other 
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Section 2: “Grand Tour” of Participant’s Mobile Device. 
 
• General understanding of how they are using the internet (or more precisely – 
mobile internet): 
o Why don’t you show me how you use your phone. I am interested in all 
your favorite applications and why you like them. Tell me about the 
applications you use the most.  
• What types of social media Russian youth prefer and how they use these 
technologies;  
o What about social media sites? Which of those do you use the most? Why 
do you use the one’s that you do? 
o Can you show me how you use these applications? Which groups or 
channels do you follow? Which are your favorites right now? 
 
Section 3: Determining Cultural Perspectives of Social Media (neutral questions 
designed to allow participants to answer according to their own personal use of 
social media, not according to implicit bias introduced from specific questions). 
 
• How do you define social media? 
• In your opinion, how is social media different from other/traditional media? 
• What do you spend most of your time doing on social media?  
• Do you use social media to organize social events? How? 
• Do you have friends who use social media to organize social events? 
• What is your favorite social media site? Why? 
• Do you use social media when you want to find out more about subjects that 
interest you?  
• Is social media an important part of your life? Why or why not? 
 
Section 4: On use of social media for civic engagement  
 
• Do you use social media to find out more about your city? 
• Do you use social media to find out about local events? 
• Do you take part in discussions about important events online? Why or why not? 
Can you think of any examples? 
• Do you think that discussions about important events online are valuable?  
• What do you think of gorodskoi pablic pages on VK? Why do people use them? 
• Do you ever read comments sections under posts to see what varieties of opinions 
exist about such topics?  
• Do you often post, comment, or share things on social media? 
• Which types of posts, if any, do you interact with or are you most likely to 
interact with? 
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Section 5: Insight into how young adults are experiencing and thinking about use of 
and social media technologies 
• How do you feel that social media is impacting the world? 
• Has it changed the way you interact with information? 
 
5.1  If/why social media are or are not a meaningful part of their lives 
• Do you feel that social media is helpful to you? Would your life be greatly 
impacted without social media? Why is it important/not important? 
• Do you think that these technologies are having an impact on Russian society? 
 
5.2 Discrepancies between information received via social media and that received 
via broadcast television (how to they reconcile different media narratives) 
• Let’s talk about a little bit different subject now, if that’s alright. Do you watch 
traditional or ‘broadcast’ media? Which channels?  
• Which programs on these channels? Do you watch news programs on broadcast 
media? Which ones? Do you feel that these programs are trustworthy? 
 
5.3 How they are influenced by narratives which contradict those on state-aligned 
media 
• What about news from alternative sources, from online? Which sources do you 
use? Do you feel that these are trustworthy? 
• Do you feel that journalists in general are trustworthy? 
• Is it a journalist’s job to provide the truth? Do they usually do this? 
• What about citizens who aren’t necessarily journalists, but who talk about their 
experiences online? Is this a trustworthy way to get information? 
• What do you think about these types of stories, published by non-journalists, that 
‘go viral’ online? 
• Do you have any acquaintances who have posted about their experiences at the 
recent protests? What do you make of their experience there? 
 
5.4 Whether or not youth see social media as a source for community-building and 
forming mutually shared views of the world  
• Do you think that social media is used to bring people together in Moscow and to 
build community? If so, in which ways? 
• Do you feel that your opinions are changed by posts, news articles, or other such 
information encountered on social media? 
• What types of posts, if any, are you most likely to share or comment on?  
• Do you ever engage in debates on social media? Have these resulted in coming to 
a common agreement about the subject at hand?  
• How do you feel about debates on social media? 
• Has information taken from social media or from these debates lead you to 
change some aspect of your life? If yes, which aspects? If yes/no, why do you feel 
this way? 
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5.5 Whether or not social media is perceived as a tool for reform, civic action, and 
valuable information or rather as a form of apolitical socialization: 
• Do you think that social media has the ability to change people’s opinions by 
sharing information that they would otherwise not have access to? 
• Do you think that it there is the possibility to enact positive change in Russia by 
using social media technologies? If yes/no then why? Do you know of any 
examples of this happening? 
 
Section 6: Questions about the recent protests in Moscow (summer 2019 about city 
council elections and who can register as a candidate): 
• How do you get information about these protests? 
• Have you been going to any of these protests? 
• Has seeing posts on social media changed your perception of those involved with 
the protests (for example, protesters or protest leaders)? 
•  
6.1  Understanding if protest leaders (the opposition in Russian politics – eg. Those 
aligned with Alexei Navalny such as Lubov Sobol’) have gained social capital 
through social media 
• From what you have seen on social media, how do you feel about those trying to 
run for city council? Are they working for the greater good in Russia? Why do 
you feel this way about them? 
• Has the information you have seen from them online made you become more 
sympathetic with their cause? Or maybe less sympathetic? 
  
Section 7: Catch-all questions: 
• Is there anything else you would like to add to the subjects we have discussed, or 
anything we may have missed? 
• Or there any other issues or points that may have been excluded from this 
interview? 
 
Conclusion and follow-up: 
• Would it be alright if I sent you some of my conclusions and analysis from this 
interview so you can review them? It is often very helpful for the researcher to 
work with participants during the analysis stage of the study.  
• Thank you again for your time. I appreciate you agreeing to be part of this study 
and hope it was an enjoyable journey of self-reflection for you. 
 
Russian Version 
Раздел 1: Письменные ответы: 
 
1.1 Демографические детали 
Возраст Пол Сколько 
вы живете 
в Москве? 
Место 
рождения 
Профессия Уровень 
образования 
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1.2 Определить откуда происходит информация 
 
• Указать сколько времени каждый день вы проводите читая или смотря 
новости 
 
 
• Выберите из представленных ниже категорий, что бы узнать откуда вы 
получаете новости. Напишите ваши ответы в процентном соотношении 
всего времени, которое вы тратите на новости в день. 
o Интернет 
o Телевидение 
o Друзья, знакомые или родственники 
o Газеты 
o Книги 
 
1.3 Предпочтительные социальные сети 
 
• Укажите сколько времени в день вы проводите в соц. сетях. 
 
• Укажите в процентном соотношении сколько времени в день вы тратите на 
каждый из этих сайтов 
o ВКонтакте  
o Instagram  
o Facebook 
o Одноклассники 
o YouTube  
o Телеграм  
o Viber 
o Twitter 
o Whatsapp  
o Другие (Укажите другие 
___________________________________________) 
 
Раздел 2: “Большой тур” в мобильные телефон участника. 
 
• General understanding of how they are using the internet (or more precisely – 
mobile internet): 
o Почему бы вам не показать мне как вы используете свой телефон. 
Мне интересно узнать о ваших любимых приложениях и почему они 
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вам нравятся. Расскажите о приложениях, которые вы используете 
чаще всего. 
• Какие социальные сети молодые люди в России предпочитают, и как они 
используют эти технологии; 
o Что насчет социальные сетей? Какие из них вы используете чаще 
всего? Почему вы их предпочитаете? 
o Сможете ли вы показать мне, как вы используете эти приложения? 
На какие группы или каналы вы подписаны? Какие ваши любимые из 
них сейчас? 
 
Раздел 3: Determining Cultural Perspectives of Social Media (neutral questions 
designed to allow participants to answer according to their own personal use of 
social media, not according to implicit bias introduced from specific questions). 
 
• Что для вас значат социальные сети? 
• По вашему мнению, как социальные сети отличаются от 
других/традиционные медиа? 
• На что ты тратишь больше всего времени в социальных сетях? 
• Используете ли вы социальные сети для создание мероприятий? Как? 
• Есть ли у вас друзья, которые используют социальные сети для создания 
мероприятий? 
• Какая у вас любимая социальная сеть и почему? 
• Используете ли вы социальные сети, когда хотите узнать больше о вещах 
которые вас интересуют? 
• Социальные сети занимают большую часть вашей жизни? Почему да или 
нет? 
 
Раздел 4: On use of social media for civic engagement (More specific, but still 
relatively vague): 
• Используете ли вы социальные сети, для того что бы узнать большой про 
свой город? 
• Используете ли вы социальные сети, что бы узнать о местных 
мероприятиях? 
• Принимаете ли вы участие в онлайн обсуждениях важных мероприятий? 
Почему да или нет? 
• Считаете ли вы что онлайн обсуждения важных мероприятий полезно? 
• Что вы думаете о городских группах во ВКонтакте? Почему люди их 
используют? 
• Вы когда-нибудь читаете комментарии под постами, что бы узнать что 
думают люди? 
• Как часто вы выкладываете посты, оставляете комментарии или делитесь 
ссылками в социальных сетях ?  
• На какие посты вы, в большинстве случаев, готовы оставить комментарий 
или поделиться? 
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Раздел 5: Insight into how young adults are experiencing and thinking about use of 
and social media technologies: 
• Как по вашему мнению социальные сети оказывают влияние  на мир? 
• Поменяли ли они то, как вы взаимодействуете с информацией? 
• Have they changed the way you interact with information? 
 
5.1 If/why social media are or are not a meaningful part of their lives;  
• Считаете ли вы, что социальные ети помогают вам? Была бы ваше жизнь 
другой без социальных сетей? Почему это так важно или не важно для вас? 
• Как вы думаете влияют ли эти технологии на общество в России? 
 
5.2 Discrepancies between information received via social media and that received 
via broadcast television (how to they reconcile different media narratives): 
• Не против ли вы, сейчас поговорить немного на другую тему? Смотрите ли 
вы традиционные или стандартные телевизионные каналы? Назовите эти 
каналы? 
• Какие программы на этих каналах вы смотрите? Вы смотрите новости по 
телевизору? Какие? Можете ли вы доверять этим программам?  
 
5.3 How they are influenced by narratives which contradict those on state-aligned 
media: 
• Что насчет новостей из альтернативных источников или онлайн? Какими из 
них вы пользуетесь? Вы чувствуете что им можно доверять?  
• Как вы считаете, можно ли доверять журналистам? 
• Вы считаете, что работа журналиста заключается в том чтобы предоставлять 
правдивую информацию? Они обычно поступают так? 
• Что насчет, простых граждан, которые не обязательно являются 
журналистами, но выражающие свои мысли онлайн? Стоит ли доверять 
полученной ими информации? 
• Что вы думаете о таких историях, опубликованных не журналистами и 
ставшими вирусными в интернете? 
• Есть ли у вас знакомые, которые написали посты об их опыте на прошедших 
недавно в Москве митингах? Что вы думаете об этом? 
 
5.4  Whether or not youth see social media as a source for civic engagement 
(whether things seen on social media will lead to actual action). 
• Вы считаете, что социальные сети направлены на сближение людей в 
Москве и на построение сообщества? Если да, то каким образом? 
• Вы считаете, что ваше мнение может изменится в связи с постами, новыми 
статьями или другой найденной информацией в социальных сетях? 
• Какими типами постов вы скорее всего поделитесь или оставите  
комментарий? 
• Вы когда–нибудь участвовали в обсуждениях в социальных сетях? Привели 
ли они к общему соглашению? 
• Как ты чувствуешь об этих обсуждениях в социальных сетях?  
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• Могла ли информация взятая из соц. сетей или из этих обсуждений привести 
к изменениям аспектов вашей жизни. Если да, то каким аспектам? Почему 
вы так считаете? 
 
5.5 Whether or not social media is perceived as a tool for reform, civic action, and 
valuable information or rather as a form of apolitical socialization: 
• Считаете ли вы, что социальные сети способны изменять мнение людей, 
обмениваясь информацией, к которой у них иначе не было бы доступа? 
• Считаете ли вы, что существует возможность добиться позитивных 
изменений в России с помощью технологий социальных сетей? Если да / 
нет, то почему? Вы знаете какие-нибудь примеры этого? 
 
Раздел 6: Questions about the recent protests in Moscow (summer 2019 about city 
council elections and who can register as a candidate): 
• Как вы получаете информацию об этих протестах? 
• Ходили ли вы на какие-либо из этих акций протеста? 
• Изменили ли посты в социальных сетях ваше восприятие тех, кто участвует 
в акциях протеста (например, протестующие или лидеры протеста)? 
 
6.1 Understanding if protest leaders (the opposition in Russian politics – eg. Those 
aligned with Alexei Navalniy such as Lubov Sobol’) have gained social capital 
through social media 
• Из того, что вы видели в социальных сетях, как вы относитесь к тем, кто 
пытается баллотироваться в городской совет? Они работают на благо 
России? Почему вы так относитесь к ним? 
• Заставила ли информация, которую вы узнали от них в Интернете, стать 
более отзывчивой к их делу? Или может быть менее сочувствующим? 
 
Раздел 7: Catch-all questions: 
• Есть ли что-то еще, что вы хотели бы добавить к темам, которые мы 
обсуждали или что-то что мы, возможно, пропустили? 
• Или есть какие-либо другие вопросы или моменты, которые могли быть 
исключены из этого интервью? 
 
Conclusion and follow-up: 
• Не против ли вы, если я отправлю вам некоторые свои выводы и анализ из 
этого интервью, чтобы вы могли их просмотреть? Исследователю часто 
очень полезно работать с участниками на этапе анализа исследования. 
• Еще раз спасибо за ваше время. Я благодарен вам за то, что вы согласились 
принять участие в этом исследовании, и надеюсь, что это было приятное 
путешествие для само рефлексии. 
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